

fronting Japan with the prospect of being totally cut off from access to petroleum products. Although they never referred to the concept by name, the documents of the period indicate that American leaders conceived of their sanctions as deterrent; they hoped to persuade Japan to forego further expansion in southeast Asia. Japanese leaders were surprised and interpreted American actions as evidence of the unrelenting hostility of the United States to Japan. American strategy persuaded Japanese leaders that they had no choice but to attack the United States.<sup>90</sup>

American sanctions have been characterized as both deterrent and compellent.<sup>91</sup> Deterrent threats, however, are only implemented if the proscribed action occurs and when these threats are carried out, deterrence fails.<sup>92</sup> By imposing sanctions *before* Japan attacked any of the colonies of southeast Asia, the United States was not practising deterrence. Nor can the strategy formally be classified as compellence, because the sanctions were not accompanied by a specific demand that Japan cease doing what it was already doing, although some members of the Roosevelt administration hoped that they might encourage Japan to rethink its intention to conquer China.

There is no elegant way of coping with the kinds of problems these cases pose. Our preferred solution is to recognize that intrawar deterrence and compellence are special cases that should be studied separately. They differ from peacetime deterrence and compellence in several important ways that critically affect their practice and

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<sup>90</sup> Paul W. Schroeder, *The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations 1941* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958); Irvine H. Anderson, Jr., *The Standard-Vacuum Oil Company and United States East Asian Policy, 1933-41* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); James William Morley, ed. *The Fateful Choice: Japan's Advance into Southeast Asia, 1939-41* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); Michael A. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Waldo Heinrichs, *Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

<sup>91</sup> Russett, "Pearl Harbor: Deterrence Theory and Decision Theory," and George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, pp.90-91, 507-508. George, Hall, and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, p.245, characterize the sanctions as compellent.

<sup>92</sup> Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, pp.2-6.