

35. It now remains for me to speak about the delicate problem of controls. In my statement on 13 May I confessed (ibid., para.53) that I did not understand why the need for an international control body had been felt so strongly in the case of the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*), why it had been sought so laboriously with a view to the conclusion of an agreement on underground explosions or an agreement limiting the production of fissile materials, while it was rejected in the case of disarmament of the sea-bed and the ocean floor. I added also that comparison with the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 [United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 402, pp.71 et seq.] and the outer-space Treaty of 1967 (General Assembly resolution 222 (XXI)(Annex)) with a view to instituting national controls founded on the principle of reciprocity did not appear to us to be truly pertinent, because, unlike the environment with which those two Treaties are concerned, the sea-bed, and above all the part covering the continental shelf, is more accessible to man and its utilization is within the reach of a greater number of States. Since then, however, we have heard with interest the explanations given to us by the representative of the United States in his latest statement, especially when he referred to international co-operation and the possibility of the review conference provided for in article III of the United States draft defining and establishing more precise procedures within an international framework (ENDC/PV.421, paras.38 et seq.).

36. For our part we still believe that, in regard to control, a minimum of internationalization must be recognized upon the entry into force of the treaty and without waiting for the review conference, the main object of which, as its name indicates, is to review rather than to institute. Moreover, it does not seem to us too difficult to imagine a simple and not necessarily costly international procedure which would channel a request for verification coming from any State, and by virtue of which the technically more developed States would accept the obligation of giving it necessary assistance. Nor do we see any difficulty in finding some body to supervise the operation of such a system and to screen requests for assistance.

49. On the question of control, the United States has suggested that we should limit ourselves to securing for the parties to the treaty, only the right to observe the activities of States on the sea-bed and the ocean floor (ENDC/PV.397, para.38). It can be pointed out that the right of access to any installation on the sea-bed provided for in the Soviet draft also allows for the possibility of observing the activities of States on the high seas. At the present time there is an international legal basis for carrying out such observation — the universally-recognized principle of the high seas. But will that be enough? We believe that the States parties to the treaty should be given more positive rights ensuring effective control over the fulfilment of obligations under the treaty banning the use of the sea-bed for military purposes. It is precisely this need that the form of control proposed by the Soviet Union has taken into account.

50. During the discussion of this question the United States delegation has expressed doubts about the feasibility of control in the event of the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed (ibid., paras.35 et seq.; ENDC/PV.411, paras.23 et seq.). We cannot agree with that view. As we have already pointed out, when there is complete demilitarization of the sea-bed there must be no military objects there, and the parties to the treaty would only have to be convinced that the existing objects were of a peaceful nature. In the case of a partial ban, however, a considerable number of military objects would be located on the sea-bed and in each specific case States would be faced with a very