4. In the event of large scale attack upon Canada in from nine to twelve months time, the General visualized the Army Air Corps sending 120 aircraft to Newfoundland composed of large 4-engine bombers, fighters, observation dive bombers and twin-engine bombers accompanied by approximately 2500 all ranks. He visualized a similar force operating from the Maritime Provinces of Canada, i.e., provided the necessary facilities were available.

[A. A. L. CUFFE]

87.

**DND HQS 3496** 

Mémorandum du chef d'état-major général au ministre de la Défense nationale

Memorandum from Chief of General Staff to Minister of National Defence

Ottawa, July 23, 1940

- 10. I am diffident in commenting on PART II, the Naval Plan, except to state that I regard the organization of port facilities and defences on the east coast of Canada, including Newfoundland, to be the primary military necessity at this date. We should be in a position (should the worst befall and the invasion of the United Kingdom by Germany become an accomplished fact) to accommodate, supply naval facilities to and to protect in its Canadian bases a large portion of the British fleet which unquestionably would make its way to this country rather than surrender. With a very considerable portion of the British fleet and possibly of the British Air Force based upon Canada, I maintain that there is still no probability of an attempt by Germany to invade this country for a period of months if not indeed of years. The threat of large scale raids will no doubt be increased but I suggest that the conversion of Iceland into an important enemy naval and air base would be necessary before he can successfully undertake a large scale invasion of the country against the forces which we then should have at our disposal.
- 11. As I have previously stated, I am quite convinced that United States military co-operation in the defence of North America is inevitable. Having in view the most probable Japanese intentions, however, I do not consider that a high proportion of the United States naval forces will be acting with us in the Atlantic.
- 13. In this preliminary reading of the Chiefs of Staff Committee plan, I have made no attempt to analyse the detail of the army plan although I will undertake this in the next few days. I would, however, recommend that apart from any questions of detailed distribution of forces that the matter of command of the Army forces allotted to the coastal areas be im-