I do not however dwell upon private litigation. No small part of the labors of the Judicial Committee has been the decision of what in the United States are called constitutional questions. The word "constitutional" has not the same connotation with us as with you. In the American sense "constitutional" means in accord with the written "constitution." With us it means in accord with the more or less vague principles upon which we conceive government should be carried on. With you what is unconstitutional is illegal however just and laudable it may be, with us that is unconstitutional which is wrong however legal it may be.

It was decided in re Bedard (1849) 7 Moore P. C. 23, that the Governor of a Colony like Canada represented Her Majesty and had power (e.g.,) to grant a patent of precedence to a newly appointed judge. But the power of a Colonial Governor in Council must be exercised in (substantially) the proper and regular way. Sometimes a Judge has been "amoved" by the Colonial authorities and reinstated by the Judicial Committee because unjustly treated by being deprived of a right to be heard. Sometimes in such a case the "amotion" has been sustained. In Montague *vs.* Lieutenant Governor Van Dieman's Land (1849) 6 Moore P. C. 489, the Judge was called on to show cause against an order for suspension only and he was amoved. The Committee held that the irregularity did not prejudice him and sustained the order of amotion. I shudder to think what would happen if an American Court were to decide the same way.

There are very many cases dealing with the power of a Colonial Parliament to punish for contempt. A com-