

discussions. He had received a visit from the Turkish Ambassador during the morning who had expressed the hope that Canada would support a resolution which would minimize the conflict rather than aggravate it. He had given the ambassador only general assurances.

2. *Mr. Fulton* read the Iranian resolution of which the operative part urged that the conference between the three governments concerned and representatives of the Cypriots not only discuss interim arrangements for the administration of Cyprus but also a final solution in accordance with the principles of the Charter and to meet the legitimate aspirations of the inhabitants of Cyprus. The modified Indian resolution prefaced its operative part with the words "believing that the Cypriot people are entitled to self-government in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations . . . requests the United Kingdom government to continue negotiations with a view to promoting self-government for Cyprus, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations etc., etc."

(Telegram Permisny, to External, Dec. 2, 1958, 2063).

3. *During the discussion* the following points were raised:

(a) The Canadian delegation had already indicated that it would support the Iranian resolution. The main difference between the Iranian resolution and the Indian resolution was that the former was acceptable to the United Kingdom while the latter was not. The Iranian resolution would likely carry in the Political Committee. Should the Indian resolution also carry, it was to be noted that it would have to obtain a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly to be approved.

(b) Abstention on Canada's part would be a sign of indifference towards this important problem. Canada should not refrain from stating its position. There was as yet no indication as to how the United States or France would vote on the Indian resolution. Public reaction in Canada would have to be taken into consideration. The position taken by the party two years previously on the Suez incident had, as later events indicated, received general approval of the public. The government was now in a position where it could not justify its action vis-à-vis its supporters if it did not stand with the United Kingdom. It was immaterial whether Canada lost its role of middle-man. It was unthinkable that Canada should not support the United Kingdom. Some, however, pointed out that the Suez and Cyprus situations were not comparable. The present government had taken a definite stand for self-determination and any vote against such a principle would have repercussions in the country. Also, it was difficult to determine the Canadian position in view of the fact that all Commonwealth countries except the United Kingdom and Canada would abstain, and also that the Canadian advisors in New York were strongly recommending that Canada abstain. On the other hand, it was doubtful whether the role of mediator should go so far as to lead Canada to vote against the United Kingdom. Abstention in this case would appear to be a vote against the United Kingdom.

4. *The Cabinet* agreed that the Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs instruct the Canadian delegation in New York to vote against the modified Indian resolution unless the United Kingdom itself decided to abstain.

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