

causation—is, upon the theistic theory, derived from our observing the consistency of the Divine Will, whether as revealed subjectively in the causal operations of our own minds, or objectively in the causal operations of Nature. Therefore, the idea of causation as between the Absolute Volition and the Relative Volition is an idea destitute of meaning. One Relative Volition may act causally on another Relative Volition, because each is wholly external to each. But all Relative Volitions are constituent parts of the Absolute Volition, which, therefore, cannot act causally *on* them, though it always acts substantially *with* them. Or, otherwise phrased, if the subject is a constituent part of its own World-eject—the volition of which is always self-consistent—it follows that the volition of the subject must always be coincident with that of its World-eject ; and this without being determined in any other sense than the smaller size of a part can be said to be determined by the larger size of its whole : i.e. the determination—if we choose so to call it—is not a causal one, but arises immediately from the inherent nature of the case. The Absolute Volition within itself is free ; the Relative Volition within itself is free ; but there can be no conflict between these two freedoms. For, if there were a conflict, it must be caused ; but where is the cause of this conflict to come from ? Not from the Absolute Volition, which is everywhere self-consistent ; not from the Relative Volition, which is wholly contained within the Absolute. Thus, regarded from within its own system,