

*Nuclear Proliferation*

ment was entered into the ratification of parliament was sought. A mere debate like this is not equivalent to the ratification of parliament.

● (1750)

Even more than that, the government has failed to refer these documents to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence where we could have heard witnesses such as General Burns, a distinguished Canadian expert on disarmament, and David Lilienthal, first chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Committee. Both these men have warned against the sale of nuclear devices. They could have explained to the Canadian people what is involved in the sale of nuclear reactors. No such explanation has been given. We have not had one single distinguished scientist quoted to us to justify the statement that these safeguards are in any way adequate. I dare say there are some who could do that, and if they could do so it might be very reassuring to the Canadian people. But that we should be left without an opportunity for a proper scientific investigation into what is involved here is, in my opinion, a shameful dereliction of democratic duty.

It somehow seems that the Canadian government is more interested in the financial aspects of these nuclear sales than the frightening potential that they may lead to disaster. David Lilienthal, to whom I have already referred, one of the best known scientists of my generation, and I think of the present generation, spoke of the "impending disaster" in the international proliferation of nuclear bombs. He is a careful scientist and not the sort of man who uses loose rhetorical phrases. He talks about the impending disaster. I got no feeling whatsoever that the minister, or the government for which he speaks, had appreciated the impending disaster, and I notice even now that he prefers to engage in a private conversation with his colleagues rather than listening to the debate.

Mr. David Lilienthal went on to say:

I am glad I am not a young man and I am sorry for my grandchildren.

The government keeps repeating that it has worked out within various agreements the best safeguards available, but we are given no details of what these safeguards are. The question obviously arises at the present time as to whether these safeguards are sufficient. Maybe they are the best, but the real question is, are they sufficient to give reasonable assurances that our nuclear material and the reactors we sell and make available to others will not be diverted to weapons material? The strongest opinion seems to be that the effectiveness of the so-called safeguards depends upon the reliability of the governments entering into or administering the agreements.

The minister said just a few months or weeks ago that there is no safeguard where there is a will to disregard these safeguards. Mr. Kenneth Fasick, who is the director of the International Division Accounting Office of the United States, in the *New York Times*, on January 31 of this year, said that the U.S. and international experts had "generally confided that the country could circumvent safeguards if it was willing to assume the risk of detection, incur the expense and take the trouble to do so". He says that the IAEA has 40 inspectors who keep track of nuclear materials and 400 nuclear facilities.

[Mr. Brewin.]

The Canadian background paper on safeguards, recently prepared by the Department of External Affairs, states that within the IAEA, the division of safeguards and inspection, there is a total staff of 186 people, 74 of whom are professional staff members. It is perfectly clear if you read the IAEA paper that it recognizes the limitations of policy in the enforcement of safeguards. In the extract from this publication at page 7 it says there is no single solution to the problem of nuclear weapons. Technological control, in the absence of genuine political commitment, is inadequate, and political willpower is likewise insufficient without an effort at the technological level. "The avoidance of nuclear war depends on the ability of nations to act co-operatively—and by adopting measures that limit and reduce the availability of such conflict. Neither effort is entirely feasible or credible without the other."

What the energy agency, the people who are expert in this field, is telling us is that we cannot depend on technological safeguards; we must also be able to depend on political willpower. Where the political circumstances are not stable any political commitment creates a situation where feasibility and credibility of safeguards are in doubt. I am not suggesting that all of the countries involved and that have been under discussion are of the same degree of political reliability. Frankly I do not think they are. However, in the choice we have made we certainly seem to have included two questionable countries. I was reading of a military coup anticipated in Argentina even today, and anybody who does not know the situation in South Korea should look into it if he thinks there is any stability in that country.

The IAEA goes on to say at page 10 that the risks of detection by the verification process are substantial. They may be substantial, but how substantial? They have to be substantial enough to be effective; if not 100 per cent in all cases, at least in a very high percentage. Yet even the IAEA says that the risks of detection are substantial. I suggest this is a very guarded way of saying that the safeguards system will not necessarily work.

Again at page 36 the IAEA states:

Cooperation between the agency and national personnel is the crucial intangible in safeguards application.

I invite somebody to look seriously into "the national personnel" in such a country as South Korea and tell us whether they find that crucial intangible satisfactory for the safeguards applied or accepted by that country.

Precisely the same message emerges in the Canadian background paper with which we have been furnished. It was prepared quite recently by the Department of External Affairs. It refers to the IAEA safeguards as an "open-ended" system whose intention is not to lay down rigid rules for safeguards implementation. On page 15 it says:

In this way the Agency endeavours to ensure the maximum effectiveness of safeguards—

I like the choice of the word "endeavours". It does not say it succeeds or there is a reasonable prospect of success, but it endeavours to do so.

On the same page it is stated that the agency's safeguards system or the NPT safeguards system "cannot prevent clandestine diversion of safeguarded nuclear material to military or explosive purposes, they can inhibit a state