

External Affairs

them, I quoted from a paragraph by the columnist, Mr. Walter Lippmann, written some weeks before these events. He was referring to a solution of the Korean conflict by negotiation through the United Nations and he said:

The only hope lay in a quiet, confidential and secret effort to work out political proposals which reflected truly the real balance of military power in the Far East. Nothing so hard and so unglamorous and so unrealistic as that was conceivable if we continued with public diplomacy as it has evolved under the television cameras at Lake Success.

For when statesmen become actors they not only stick to their parts in the show, but, it may be added, they are stuck with their parts. They can be more and more of whatever they have been. But on pain of unpopularity—even it might be of denunciation and Congressional investigation—they cannot appear to be a little bit less.

Thus by the "hoopla" system of diplomacy—which some say is so wonderfully enlightening—every difficult issue, not infrequently a comparatively easy issue, is likely to become insoluble as each actor-statesman rises to such peaks of public righteousness that in public he cannot possibly descend again into commonsense.

Then, there is no hope except to turn off the lights, to shut down the microphones, to take away the stage props, to wash off the make-up, to disperse the crowds, and to let a few men absent themselves from publicity awhile.

That seemed to me to be very sound common sense, Mr. Speaker, and that is why I ventured to quote it in one or two speeches that I have made recently. I agree entirely of course with what the leader of the opposition has said, that any statement on international affairs at the present time must be made in the light of the effect it will have on what we now call the cold war, and how it will be exploited by our enemies in that war. That must be in anybody's mind who makes any public statement at this time. But surely the hon. member will admit that that does not mean that we should not on occasion, as spokesmen for the Canadian government, speak our minds in a frank and friendly way outlining the issues as we see them and outlining the effect of these issues on our relations with our neighbours and with our friends.

In this connection I should like to quote again from the statement of the leader of the opposition this afternoon an excerpt which expresses exactly what I have in mind. He said:

I think, Mr. Speaker, that there is much more to fear in the suppression of discussion in the United States, in Canada, in Great Britain or in any other democracy than there is in complete freedom of democracy, so that out of the exchange of ideas and the examination of weaknesses there may be greater strength for the long struggle which lies ahead.

If I may, Mr. Speaker, I should now like to say a few words about some questions of policy which have come up in the course of this discussion regarding the war in Korea.

[Mr. Pearson.]

I thought that in my earlier statement I had made fairly clear our own understanding of what the policy should be in this conflict, but since there still seems to be some confusion on this subject I will try to go over that ground again. Let me say at the outset, I may be wrong, but I do not think—having regard to the statements that have been made in this house—that there should be any misunderstanding as to the policy of the government in respect of these matters. I think however that there is real doubt as to what the policy of the official opposition is in this matter because of the apparent differences of view among its individual members.

The hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra (Mr. Green) insisted the other day that our objective "should be to gain victory in Korea just as quickly as possible". To that end he recommended that enemy bases in Manchuria should be bombed, that a naval blockade should be imposed against communist China, and that the nationalist Chinese forces now on the island of Formosa should be incorporated in the United Nations forces in Korea, or the restriction on their use should be removed.

Mr. Green: If I may correct the minister, I said I did not see why they should not be used in Korea. With regard to the bombing of bases, if the minister will refer to page 2783 of *Hansard* he will find that I said:

I suggest that we should not tie General Ridgway's hands in dealing with these bases. If it is necessary for him to bomb them in order to win the war, then let him bomb them.

An hon. Member: What is the difference?

Mr. Pearson: I am sorry if I misquoted or misinterpreted what the hon. member said. From his own reading of what he said he would give to the general on the spot the decision as to whether the Manchurian bases should or should not be bombed. I will let it go at that.

Mr. Drew: Mr. Speaker, may I ask the minister if that was not exactly what he said a few days ago in this house?

Mr. Pearson: No, Mr. Speaker, it was not. If the leader of the opposition would read what I said he would find that I did not say that. Incidentally, the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra did mention in the course of his very interesting statement the offer of three divisions of the Chiang Kai-shek nationalist forces for Korea on July 3. That is on page 2783 of *Hansard*, and on that page the hon. member said: "The offer was turned down." But he might have added that it was turned down at that time by General MacArthur. When that offer was repeated