

recoup appropriate expenditures made to the benefit of other departments and a realistic assessment of the cost of maintaining maritime forces for the assertion of sovereignty, collective security, and other purposes could be obtained.

The Subcommittee notes that the adoption by the Government of the Planning-Programming-Budgeting-System (PPBS) approach to expenditure and the new form of presentation of Estimates to the House of Commons makes such an apportionment of costs of maritime forces possible once a comprehensive and detailed cost-benefit analysis has been carried out.

11.6 Organizational considerations

The Subcommittee has given considerable attention to the question of whether the Canadian maritime forces maintained by the various government departments should be integrated. The present divided structure appears to be somewhat unusual, with most nations consolidating their maritime forces under operational control of one or two agencies.

The primary argument for integration of maritime forces is to achieve greater co-ordination of operations and, particularly, more efficient use of equipment through multi-tasking. This would involve the delegation of appropriate authority for both military and non-military duties to officers commanding vessels. The Subcommittee considers that such integration might well facilitate better planning of operations, and achieve economies through use of common support and training facilities.

Several arguments against total integration of Canada's maritime forces were presented to the Subcommittee. Of these, four seemed particularly relevant:

First, total integration of all Canadian maritime forces under the Department of National Defence appeared inadvisable from an organizational point of view. It would be inconsistent with the reorganization of the Canadian Armed Forces as a unified military force; extend the scale of military operations into non-military areas and make civilian control of such operations more difficult; and might give the impression that Canada was increasing the size of and expenditures on its armed forces.

Secondly, the existence of separate maritime services has permitted innovation and development in non-military areas of expertise such as ice-breaking and oceanography that might well have not been given any priority in a single integrated service facing other more immediate demands.

Thirdly, the increasing potential use of maritime forces to enforce sovereignty and extraterritorial jurisdiction against non-military violation or exploitation, possibly by Canada's military allies as well as others, may make it desirable on occasion for non-military maritime forces to be able to carry out police type functions, thereby avoiding any military implications.

Fourthly, personnel of the various existing maritime forces had often joined these specifically because of the work carried out and the specializations involved. Although integration of all the maritime forces would provide greater possibilities for mobility and advancement, the Subcommittee concluded that this was not necessarily desirable from the point of view of either the services or the personnel involved, in that it might dilute the specialization currently developed and maintained. Further, there seemed some doubt that those who had deliberately joined, or would in the future join, a non-military service would serve or want to serve in the armed forces (or vice versa).