

how many bowls of rice could be purchased for the price of a missile, or who condemn governments for spending anything at all on defence.

I do not deny that there is an element of truth and validity in an unconditionally pacifist position. I simply say that it is simplistic to ignore the real, complex and often immoral world to which our moral choices must apply. The Pope himself recognized this fact in a message he sent last June to the second United Nations special session on disarmament. "In current conditions," he wrote, "deterrence based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself, but as a step toward a progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable."

I believe that the Soviet peoples desire peace just as much as the peoples of the free world. But I also know that the Soviets are very heavily armed. In these circumstances, it would be almost suicidal for the West to adopt a policy of unilateral disarmament, or a policy of suffocating the development of new means of defending ourselves against the Soviet SS-20s. That is the kind of heroic moral choice which an individual could make in his personal life, but does anyone have the right to impose that choice upon a whole nation, or upon the community of free countries?

When the choice is between steadfastness or weakness in the face of totalitarianism, history should have taught us that to refuse to risk one's life in defence of liberty is to risk losing liberty, without any guarantee of saving one's life.

That is why the Government of Canada has chosen, not without anguish or full awareness of the risk, to join our NATO partners in adopting a policy of strength in reaction to the Soviet Union.

In supporting the two-track strategy of the Atlantic alliance, however, we shall insist that progress be made simultaneously on both tracks. This combination of steadfastness of purpose and willingness to negotiate seems to be bearing fruit, as witness the latest offer of General-Secretary Andropov to take into account the numbers of warheads as well as missiles.

Indeed, are we to think that this new-found flexibility of Mr. Andropov is a straightforward show of goodwill? Are we to believe seriously that, on two occasions since last December, the Soviets would have contemplated publicly a reduction of their nuclear forces if we had weakened in our resolve?

To me, the answer is clear. And it is absolutely essential that the United States continue its efforts to negotiate the removal of the SS-20s in exchange for the non-deployment of new American missiles in Europe, or at least to negotiate smaller numbers of missiles on each side.

I hope that my explanation of our policy will have established that, were we to agree

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