

of a series of messages from the United States Government. Mr. Seaborn reported to the North Vietnamese that United States policy was to see to it that North Vietnam contained itself and its ambitions within the territory allocated to its administration by the 1954 Geneva Agreements. He added that United States policy in South Vietnam was to preserve the integrity of that state's territory against guerilla subversion. He stated that the United States had indicated that it was not seeking military bases in the area and was not seeking to overthrow the communist regime in Hanoi. The Commissioner informed the North Vietnamese Prime Minister that the United States considered itself fully aware of the degree to which Hanoi controls and directs the guerilla action in South Vietnam and that the United States held Hanoi directly responsible for that action. He also made it clear that the United States considered the confrontation with North Vietnamese subversive guerilla action as part of a general confrontation with this type of violent subversion in other lesser developed countries. Therefore, the United States regarded its stake in resisting a North Vietnamese victory in South Vietnam as having a significance of worldwide proportions. The Commissioner mentioned examples of United States policy of peaceful coexistence having benefited communist regimes, such as Yugoslavia and Poland. The Commissioner also reported that American public and official patience with North Vietnamese aggression was growing extremely thin and he feared that if the conflict in the area should escalate, which he did not think was in anyone's interest, then the greatest devastation would result for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam itself. Mr. Seaborn reported that he was convinced that Pham Van Dong understood the importance and the context of the message he conveyed, and the seriousness with which the United States viewed the situation in South East Asia. To that extent it was judged that the initial purpose of this first contact had been successfully accomplished.

The second visit, despite its timing, was not occasioned by the incidents of August 2 and 4 in the Gulf of Tonkin and the air strikes against North Vietnamese territory on August 5. These occurred after Mr. Seaborn had arranged to travel to Hanoi on August 10 on Commission business. On August 8 the Canadian Government agreed to relay to Mr. Seaborn a further message from the United States Government repeating many of the points made in the previous message and making clear that, "if the DRVN persists in its present course it can expect to suffer the consequences". This message was based on the talking points which were published in the New York Times on June 13, 1971. This message was transmitted to Pham Van Dong on August 13, 1964. Despite its severity the Canadian Government believed that because of its importance and in the interests of peace it should be transmitted faithfully in accordance with our undertaking to the United States. According to our Commissioner's report, the North