

sexual offences within the Canadian Forces is staggering. If one includes within the category of sexual assaults all assaults in which the victim is a woman, more than half of the 141 crimes listed were either sexual assaults or physical assaults against women: 76 out of 141 cases, or 54 per cent. It is very telling that not only did these figures not appear in the text of the report but in commenting on these statistics, Hewson noted that the crime case synopsis 'does not, statistically, reveal any significant or alarming trends.'⁵¹ Moreover, the recommendation to study further the 'higher frequency of sexual assaults' did not even make it into the Report's Summary of *Main Recommendations*.⁵²

What is being revealed at the Somalia Inquiry is the extent to which even Canada's beloved blue-bereted soldiers rely on the racism, violence and sexism which is inherent in the creation of soldiers and militarized masculinity. In an observation which could serve as a textbook definition of militarism and militarized masculinity (and which could have been read as a prediction of Shidane Arone's murder in Somalia when the Airborne was deployed there almost ten years later), Major R.W.J. Wenek wrote in 1984:

The defining role of any military force is the management of violence by violence, so that individual aggressiveness is, or should be, a fundamental characteristic of occupational fitness in combat units. This is implicitly recognized in the aggressive norms of behaviour permitted and encouraged in elite units, such as commandos, paratroopers, and special service forces. Particularly in units such as these, but also in other combat units, behaviour which may be considered verging on the sociopathic in peacetime becomes a prerequisite for survival in war. Aggressiveness must be selected for in military organizations and must be reinforced during military training, but it may be extremely difficult to make fine distinctions between those individuals who can be counted on to act in an appropriately aggressive way and those likely at some time to display inappropriate aggression. *To some extent, the risk of erring on the side of excess may be a necessary one in an organization whose existence is premised on the instrumental value of aggression and violence.*⁵³

Or, as a paratrooper in the newly recreated Light Infantry Battalion at Petawawa noted: 'People worry we're too aggressive. But that's what soldiers are supposed to be. You don't go out and give the enemy a kiss. You kill them.'⁵⁴

CONCLUSIONS

The observations presented here about the Somalia Inquiry and the peacekeeping mission in Cambodia are intended, first, to call into question the very comfortable assumptions about peacekeeping which prevail in both national and international contexts. They are intended, secondly, to outline some of the ways in which peacekeeping politics – like all politics – depend upon gendered and racialized hierarchies. Soldiers are not born, they are made; and the training of soldiers depends in part upon notions of militarized masculinity which privilege violence, racism and sexism. This is true whether those soldiers are trained for warfare or for peacekeeping, and indeed, many proponents of peacekeeping argue that soldiers *must* be trained in the arts of war in order to be able to perform their peacekeeping duties.⁵⁵ The cases presented here, however, suggest that if there *is* a future for peacekeeping, then at a minimum we need to rethink the automatic response found in most quarters that soldiers make the best peacekeepers: for many women in Cambodia and for the Somali men killed by Canadian peacekeepers, it is quite clear that soldiers trained well in the arts of militarized masculinity can by far also make the worst peacekeepers.

NOTES

1. See, for example, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, New York: United Nations, 1992, Ch. V and *passim*; and *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*, A/50/60, 25 January 1995.
2. Cited from R.M. Jennar, 'UNTAC: "international triumph" in Cambodia?', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1994, p. 145. See also Judy L. Ledgerwood, 'UN Peacekeeping missions: the lessons from Cambodia', *Analysis from the East-West Center No. 11*, Honolulu: East-West Center, March 1994; Janet E. Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in Cambodia*, New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994, pp. 1–8. Peter Utting also notes the way in which 'world opinion has been quick to label the United Nations operation in Cambodia "a success"', and contrasts that view with the research presented in his volume on the social consequences of UNTAC. See Peter Utting, 'Introduction: linking peace and rehabilitation in Cambodia', in Utting, *Between Hope and Insecurity: The Social Consequences of the Cambodian Peace Process*, Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1994, p. 3 and *passim*.