entails the use of both formal and informal practices and principles associated with the cooperative development of CBMs. When conditions are supportive, the confidence building process can *facilitate, focus, synchronize, amplify, and generally structure the potential for a significant positive transformation in the security relations of participating states.* Thus, the confidence building process involves more than simply the production of a confidence building agreement and definitely should not be confused with what CBMs themselves do. The process extends well beyond this operational output. It is also (and more importantly) about *structuring the potential for change in a stressed and suspicious security relationship.*

This is the key to understanding confidence building according to the transformation view. The confidence building process, because of its nature, provides an explicit framework for the development of new security relationships structured at least in part by new, more cooperative rules and practices. Confidence building, because of its basic character, is able to facilitate and structure the potential for change in security relationships when at least some states are dissatisfied with, and beginning to question, *status quo* security policies and approaches. Policy makers do not need to understand this explicitly as they pursue confidence building solutions — although it will help. The transformation view explains why they can be successful in certain circumstances when they attempt to improve security relations by developing cooperative confidence building arrangements.

Transformation

A transformation in security relations is primarily the product of developing, negotiating, and implementing a confidence building agreement and its associated practices and principles when the potential for positive change in a security relationship is emergent. Transformation is an intrinsically psychological and sociological process that involves a positive shift in specialist and policy maker beliefs about (1) the nature of the threat

posed by other states, and (2) broader understandings of the nature of security relations and how they work, structured by those beliefs about threat.

It may be profound or (more likely) modest, but the shift in thinking must entail a meaningful positive change where conceptions of threat as well as basic understandings of security relationships snap into a new, more positive focus: cooperation and policy coordination become both thinkable and desirable. It is unlikely to be a consciously motivated process where "transformation" is clearly seen by policy makers to be the goal. It is more likely to be the associated product of more prosaic objectives such as increasing predictability and transparency as well as controlling the risks associated with misperception and unintended conflict. In this process, relationships dominated by distrust become moderated and new, more cooperative practices and principles replace security conceptions now seen to be inadequate. Transformation does not necessarily see adversaries changed into friends overnight, but it does entail at minimum a shift to a more neutral status.

The serious pursuit of legitimate confidence building arrangements, according to the transformation view, is an activity that is particularly well-suited to fostering positive changes in security thinking (transformation) when conditions are supportive. This is due to the activity's basic character and the reinforcing nature of the confidence building measures that comprise an arrangement. The basic character of confidence building is generally cooperative and hence primarily non-zero-sum in nature. This is an essential characteristic of confidence building, a portrayal that most accounts in the professional literature support and many policy makers understand. While the process obviously involves negotiation amongst those embedded in a predominantly adversarial relationship, the main goals are coordination and cooperation, not disadvantaging other participants for purposes of unilateral advantage. Thus, it is a paradigm-shifting rather than paradigm-confirming activity. While negotiations may begin with a