

development is needed to avoid repeating past errors when development co-operation resumes in a conflict's aftermath. **The choice before us seems to be between approaches which essentially follow one of two scenarios:**

a) decry the cost of emergencies, try to set limits on relief expenditures and focus on resuming traditional approaches to long-term development as soon as possible; or

b) strive for a better understanding of the root causes of conflict; try new ways of making aid relevant to support the transition from emergency to development in countries where Canada has substantial ongoing interests.

There is ample evidence of the failure of the first approach. One example of the need to change is the rigidity of World Bank regulations, which allow the Bank to provide emergency grants to UNICEF or UNHCR for Rwanda, but prevent it from allocating the same sum toward clearing Rwanda's arrears. Stakeholders in the Bank, like Canada, should see to it that action is taken so that such anomalies are corrected. A more optimistic note is sounded by the **growing attention paid to the horrendous problem of land mines as an impediment to reconstruction** and, therefore, development. Few aid agencies have figured out which part of their aid apparatus should take on this task. CIDA needs to do so.

Research in progress may help donors understand what programming approaches are most beneficial to the transition from emergency to development assistance. However, it will not answer the key question concerning the locus of responsibility and funding for post-conflict **rehabilitation and reconstruction (R&R)**. The sums needed are enormous and clearly exceed both the mandate and resources allocated to emergency programming.

4.3.4 A new role for aid agencies?

Somalia was a sobering lesson, but successes can also be celebrated: Mozambique, Cambodia, Namibia. Even so, complex emergencies are justly named, and the lessons of one situation cannot be applied like a cookie-cutter to the next crisis.

What humanitarian agencies are starting to perceive is that conflict prevention and R&R programming lead into alien fields and time frames, where the immediate rather than the long-term is all-important. The work is messy, ill-defined and sometimes unpalatable: demobilization of combatants, international war crimes tribunals, human rights monitors, police training, de-mining, social services for child soldiers and traumatized war orphans. This kind of programming escapes standard donor policy grids and does not conform to familiar supply bases. It is hard to reconcile with "results-based management" — how to prove that a conflict has been averted, an upheaval avoided, a rise in lawlessness prevented, or peace built?