

indicated in Table 7, the best opportunities are likely to be found at the stages of production, issue to the armed forces, training and operational deployment, which are the ones on which verification and CBMs are focused. However, any information obtained in the early stages of the life cycle, such as might be gained from NIM or observation of testing, should be made available to aid in the interpreting of information concerning production. Similarly, indications that equipment was being withdrawn from operational deployment should be combined in a harmonious form with evidence needed to determine whether it had been expended, intentionally destroyed, put into storage or transferred to another country.

Opportunities for harmonization and synergies in the converging roles of arms control, confidence-building measures and peace operations are presented by proper combination of the means of collecting information throughout the life cycle of major weapon systems.

Types of Harmonization

Some aspects of the operations of the regimes being discussed in this paper are more amenable to harmonization than others, and more likely to profit from it.

By its very nature, the exchange of information among a number of different sources and recipients in different countries in different parts of the world could resemble the Tower of Babel unless a considerable degree of harmonization is introduced. Apart from language, the problem of amassing, managing and presenting a large volume of data in such a way as to permit rapid access to the most recent material, as well as the capability for analysis of records extending over a long time span, is a formidable one, but is well suited for the modern techniques of data-processing. This is likely to demand harmonization of reporting procedures and formats, communications and data-processing equipment, and adoption of a common terminology.

For both information exchange and judgments regarding compliance, it would be advantageous to harmonize the definitions of various weapon systems among different regimes. For example,

the CFE and CSCE have well-harmonized definitions of various types of armoured fighting vehicles, combat aircraft and artillery weapons. Future agreements for arms limitation in other regions, and regimes intended to control proliferation of conventional arms should adopt definitions in harmony with those already in effect. As technology improves and new systems are designed, problems can arise as to the categories into which new weapons should be placed, as they work their way through the life cycle of testing, production, training, deployment, transfer and elimination.

Another aspect of harmonization is maximization of the opportunities to exploit the synergy available from the combined operations of several activities that have a common goal. An example is the scheduling of aerial or on-site inspections so as to extract the best information, to be able to notice significant changes, and to make it as difficult as possible for non-compliance to escape detection. Unless there is real reason to suspect non-compliance at a particular site, repeated inspections at short intervals are unlikely to uncover new information, and could cause considerable inconvenience to the site. On the other hand, rigid timetables remaining unchanged over a long time may offer an opportunity for escaping the detection of illegal activity. The synergy of the combined programs of the several nations that have quotas for overflights of the same territory under the provisions of the CFE and Open Skies treaties can be maximized by proper harmonization of their flight schedules.

As new regimes of multilateral but less than global scope are formed, their effectiveness will be influenced by their membership. Harmonization of CFE with CSCE is made more difficult by the larger membership of the CSCE. The presence of tiny states with little power or responsibility is likely to introduce added costs and make procedures more cumbersome, without contributing much to the efficiency of the regime. Addition to the membership of a non-proliferation regime of states more interested in selling than controlling armaments is unlikely to improve the effectiveness of its operations.

