

1. Introduction

"The objective for these negotiations shall be to conclude an agreement on additional measures aimed at further strengthening security and stability in Europe, and pursuant to the Mandate, *including measures to limit the personnel strength of their conventional armed forces within the area of application.*" (Emphasis added).

It is clear from the interest that has been shown in the European talks that the subject of personnel reductions is one that is being followed with great care and concern by states in at least one area of the world. It is appropriate, however, that a study of the challenges and opportunities inherent in the verification of personnel levels ought to be general enough to have potential application throughout the world, including in peacekeeping contexts. The recent case of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), established after the Gulf War pursuant to Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) to monitor Iraqi compliance with various disarmament measures, is indicative of the demands which are likely to be placed increasingly on the United Nations (UN) with respect to arms control verification. In the future, such demands may well include verifying personnel limitations. Of course, there will have to be variations developed to meet local conditions in different regions, but most of the basic considerations and conclusions could be relevant to areas and situations beyond those of CFE.

The objective of this study is to examine the subject of limitations on military personnel, the methods by which an agreement to limit personnel could be verified, and the probable effectiveness of these methods. This study does not attempt to make a judgement as to the wisdom of negotiating limits on military personnel, but is confined to a preliminary consideration of whether effective verification of such an agreement is possible, and what would be the likely steps needed to carry it out.