

adaptive processes occurring in American foreign policy may ultimately prove to be only tactical in nature, Washington's attitudes toward the CSCE have evolved from the suspiciousness of 1966 to a rapprochement with and qualified acceptance of Soviet positions by the time of the Moscow summit and the Brezhnev-Kissinger conversations in September 1972. Differences continue to exist, but by the beginning of 1973 the two governments could no longer be said to "speak different languages" on the matters to be pursued at the CSCE.⁵⁷

In Western Europe there is a widespread and substantial interest in cooperating with the Soviet Union on security matters. The development of an equilibrium in Soviet and American strategic military power has increased West European scepticism about the guarantees of security provided by Washington.⁵⁸ Of the NATO governments, France and West Germany in particular, and also Italy, Belgium, Norway and Denmark are displaying "realism" and a "sober approach" to the CSCE.⁵⁹ "Healthy trends" of this kind are the result of a heightened awareness of the consequences of nuclear war, a desire for greater independence from the United States, an unwillingness to shoulder new economic burdens of defense, and the "peace initiatives" of the socialist countries in their dealings with the Brandt Government. The December 1969 NATO Council decision lowering the threshold for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe has also stimulated interest in