

other.¹⁴⁴ Huth and Russett attempted to test the influence of past resolve on the effectiveness of extended deterrence by three different measures: whether the defender fought on behalf of its protege in the previous encounter, whether it was successful in that encounter, and whether it was linked to the protege by a formal alliance.¹⁴⁵

The three indicators of resolve used by Huth and Russett do not measure directly either resolve or adversarial perceptions of resolve. The previous challenge of a protege may not be the most recent deterrence encounter in which the defender's resolve has been tested, nor is it necessarily the most recent encounter with the same adversary. Huth and Russett also code the outcome of cases without any reference to how the actors themselves perceived the outcomes. In several cases, there is evidence of significant discrepancy between their interpretation of the outcome and those of the parties involved. This approach also presupposes that the most recent previous encounter, regardless of its severity, outcome, or locale, is the most important trigger of learning. There are both conceptual and empirical reasons for doubting the validity of this assumption.¹⁴⁶

There is no reason to assume that the immediately prior deterrence encounter is the critical one for a defender. The "lesson" of Munich had an enormous influence in shaping the American practice of deterrence even though the United States was not involved in the crisis that led to the Munich settlement.¹⁴⁷ Munich became the

¹⁴⁴ Russell J. Leng, "When Will They Ever Learn? Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent Crises," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27 (September 1983), pp.379-419, found that victors tend to repeat their strategies, but will adopt more coercive strategies if their adversaries do. Crises that end in compromise or war also encourage more coercive strategies, unless the war was perceived as "unwanted."

¹⁴⁵ Huth and Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work?"

¹⁴⁶ Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," *International Security* 7 (Winter 1982-83), pp.3-30; Lebow, "Conclusions," Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence*, pp.217-220, discuss the problems of drawing inferences about a deterrer's resolve on the basis of its leaders' past performance.

¹⁴⁷ Ernest R. May, "*Lessons*" of the Past: *The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); Richard Ned Lebow, "Generational Learning and Foreign Policy," *International Journal* 40 (Autumn 1985), pp.556-585.