

does not touch the notion of creation. It merely concludes that the materials of which the universe is composed must have been arranged by intelligence; which no more implies that God created the universe, than the circumstance of a watchmaker having arranged the parts of a watch implies that he created them.

Here let us for an instant pause, and take note of our position. We have seen, that could a person be supposed seriously to hold the position of an Atheist, it is impossible, proceeding upon a view of the world, either as a world simply, or as such a world in particular, to dislodge him from it by logical process. But you will observe that I have not denied that the universe bears testimony to its Author. I have not denied that the lesson of the Divine existence may be learned from the fact alone even of the existence of the universe. Still less have I denied that the arrangements of the universe, its marvellous beauty, its endless and perfect harmonies, have power to elevate us beyond themselves to Him who produced them. I believe, on the contrary, that the existence of a Creator is hymned forth by every object in heaven above, and in the earth beneath, and in the waters under the earth—and hymned forth in such a manner as to convey to intelligent creatures a legitimate conviction of the truth that God exists. Only *the hymn is not a syllogism*. Between nature and the Divine existence there is no logical connection. What nature does, whether considered in its bare reality, or in its marks of design, is simply (as we found the argument from final causes affirming) to stimulate the conception of its Author in the mind—to wake the soul, too apt to slumber on in heavy forgetfulness of an ever-present God, to the thought and conviction of his presence. I do not understand, that, at bottom, I differ much, if at all, from those Christian apologists who are accustomed to present that argument, as well as the argument from the contingency of the world, in full bristling syllogistic array. The only difference, if difference there be, is this: agreeing with them in the weighty positions which they begin by laying down—as, for instance, the position now before us, that, when objects are observed disposed in an orderly manner, an intelligent cause is suggested to the mind—I cannot admit the success of their endeavours to proceed logically beyond such Premises. We can proceed further, as I shall presently attempt to illustrate; but it must be reflectively, not logically.

The true function of nature, in respect of the question of the Divine existence, being what I have described, you will see why I assigned the place of eminence, among all the arguments for the being of God, to the third—that from the conception of God in the mind. *The others are merely its forerunners*. All that they accomplish is effected through means of the conception of God which they arouse. *How* the universe awakens the conception of God is a question which need not now be discussed. Enough that it does so, or is fitted to do so, and that not exclusively, nor even in a special degree, to men of science; for, though it is proper that Science, here as elsewhere, should consecrate her acquisitions to Religion, it does not after all need high scientific culture, nor a library of painful treatises, to satisfy us that the world is full of order and beauty. We see it at a glance, though we may be neither astronomers nor botanists, in every golden fire that frets the vault above us, and in every veined and tinted leaf which the winds of autumn scatter at our feet.

The Cartesian argument for the being of God, in which the value of the conception of God, inspired in the mind through the contemplation of the universe or in any other manner, is sought to be determined, is called after the name of the illustrious father of modern philosophy, because it was first regularly developed by him—though, as Leibnitz remarked, its germs had previously been thrown out by Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury. It was afterwards advanced in a very inferior form by Dr. Samuel Clarke, the friend of Sir Isaac Newton, in his discourse concerning the being and attributes of God. This argument, whose two great steps are, that the conception of The Perfect Being