attention to an alleged difficulty in inducing a County Court Judge to pay his debts, and charges that "he does not show a good example in giving obedience to executions from neighbouring Courts." We do not publish the letter as it is rather strong in its language, and too indefinite in its charges; we think, moreover, that our generally correct informant must have been misled.

Another correspondent sends us the advertisement of an attorney, &c., who, after publishing his card, thus modestly blows his own trumpet:—"N.B.—All suits in superior courts of law attended to with promptness." We are sorry to think that a B.A., for such he advertises himself to be, should require to assure the public that he is not as he assumes other men to be. We could almost suppose that this advertisement was intended to counteract some verdict against him for negligence, but we really have never heard of his being accused of carelessness, and are prepared to believe that he is, notwithstanding his *nota bene*, quite as good as the rest of us, though somewhat tangled on the subject of professional etiquette.

The daily papers have in another case, however, shewn, if their report be correct, a much more objectionable proceeding on the part of a firm of attorneys in Toronto, who it is alleged endeavoured to intimidate certain gentlemen of a grand jury, who, in consequence, felt called upon to bring the matter before the judge. We trust it was not as bad as it looked, but we never saw any denial or explanation offered.

It is impossible to keep the standard of professional conduct too high. We are all concerned in this matter. Those who offend thoughtlessly only need a word of kindly warning or playful chaff, those who do so "of malice aforethought" should be dealt with by the strong hand of those in authority.

PROGRESS IN PLEADING.

Lord Hobart gave as a reason for special demurrers that "they existed in order that law might be an art." But this is a reason which, in the technical language of the craft, may be fairly styled "insufficient in substance." Professional ideas have in course of years gradually undergone changes, so that at length it is recognised that the determination of causes of action upon their merits is preferable to artistic precision on niceties of pleading. And so the practical conclusion has been reached, both by lawmakers in the legislature and law-expounders on the bench, that substance is not any longer to be sacrificed to form.

The slow growth of the law to such a consummation affords many illustrations of the conservative maxims, "*principiis obsta*" and "*quieta ne movere*," which were made use of as arguments against all changes or amendments. It is almost incredible to read that such men as Dunning defended the absurd trial by wager of battle, and that Lord Raymond opposed the sensible statute requiring all law proceedings to be in English. In like manner the barbaric process entitled "wager of law" was preserved till a period comparatively recent. The curious student may refer to the last reported case on this style of pleading in *King* v. *Williams*, 2 B. & C. 528, and after reading it may congratulate himself on the 90th section of the Common Law Procedure Act, which provides that "the signature of counsel shall not be required to any pleading, nor shall any wager of law be allowed."

A good story is told of Baron Parke, which manifests the delight that famous lawyer had in the intricacies of special pleading. Paying a visit to one of his colleagues, a man of great intellect and attainments and a sound lawyer, who was at the time very ill, Baron Parke told his