

was supported by Wolfe, whose small army was used as a local landing party at Quebec.

These are not the only reasons. It is worth while to follow out in detail how 277 sail managed to get up the intricate St. Lawrence without good charts, without anything to mark the channel, and without making much use of local pilots. There is at least the living material of dramatic action in the accounts of the boarding of the *Prudent* and *Bienfaisant* at Louisburg, the attack by the French fire-ships at Quebec, and the fight between the British van and French rear on the way to Montreal. And even the most jejune of entries must have some interest when they refer to men like Boscawen or the future Lord St. Vincent, or to events like Wolfe's midnight advance to the landing place that has ever since borne his name, or when they were made by the hand of a man like the celebrated Captain Cook.

The Army loses nothing by all this. On the contrary, its effective adaptability to its proper part in joint expeditions is brought out in the clearest light. And the ideal of the United Service is shown to be as much above the exaltation of the Navy at the expense of the Army as the ideal of the Army is above the exaltation of the Infantry at the expense of the other branches of its own Service.

War is far from being the all-in-all of a nation's history. But it has been, and still is, a great determining factor; and, in the last analysis, it is the most searching test of national worth. And the public will never fully understand its influence on Canada's past, or on her international position at the present day, till they learn that all her imperial history and defence must be studied from the United Service point of view.

It is hoped that the foregoing reasons may be held to justify the appearance of this volume in the Champlain series. It is also hoped that the arrangement adopted may serve all the purposes of the student. The subject-matter of the