While it may be inexpedient to prescribe rules of practice by statute, nothing relating to the jurisdiction should however be left in doubt or to inference.

By Section 23, proceedings in appeals from Decrees, Judgments or Orders in Equity and Admiralty, &c., shall, when not otherwise provided for, be as nearly as possible in conformity with the present practice of the Judicial Committee. I can discover nothing with reference to proceedings on appeals from the other Courts. The inference, I presume, would be, that some difference was contemplated. If proceedings on appeals from the Equity and Admiralty Courts are to be according to the practice of the Judicial Committee, why should not the same practice prevail with respect to appeals from the other Courts? While a distinction is apparent, I cannot perceive that any other practice is substituted in lieu thereof.

As to the second point—Considering that there is in this Province an appeal to the Supreme Court from the Equity Court, the Court of Marriage and Divorce, Probate Courts, County Courts, and a general supervision over the proceedings of all inferior tribunals, not expressly taken away by Statute, where matters as well of the greatest magnitude as of very small amount, and involving no important principle, are constantly in controversy, to allow a suitor, in a case of the latter character, to drag his opponent to Ottawa on appeal from a judgment in which the whole matter in controversy might only range from £5 to £50, would only be affording means of gratifying a litigious spirit, or wearing out an adversary, and, in my opinion, conferring on all parties a curse rather than a blessing. By way of illustration, take the case of a cause tried in a County Court in which there is a verdict. The party against whom it is rendered applies in that Court for a new trial, it is refused; he appeals to the Supreme Court at Fredericton; the appeal is dismissed and judgment of County Court affirmed: surely in a matter ranging from £5 to £50, this is law enough; but under this Bill the party might of right appeal to Ottawa.

As to the third point—I cannot understand why periods so long should be allowed for appealing, either in cases of final judgments or interlocutory orders.

If, as provided by Section 36, no appeal shall be allowed upon special cases, or on points reserved, or in cases of new trials, unless notice in writing be given to the opposite party within twenty days after the decision complained of, or within such further time as the Court appealed from or a Judge thereof may allow, why might not the same rule apply to all other cases?

In addition to this, it seems to me that there should be stringent provisions that the Appeal shall be promptly proceeded with. After a party has the judgment of a competent Court in his favor, and perhaps realized his judgment, why should he be kept in uncertainty and doubt as to his right for two years? Surely he ought to have the right to say to his opponent, "The Court has given judgment in my favor; if you are not satisfied give me immediate notice, and proceed at once to have the judgment reviewed on appeal. Don't keep me in suspense and jeopardy for two years."

This applies with even more force to Interlocutory Orders or Rules. The Bill gives six months in such cases. In the meantime large expenses may be incurred and a final judgment obtained; while all this is going on, it would seem by this Bill a party may lie by till the six months are about expiring; and then, by appealing against some Interlocutory Order or Rule, possibly overturn all the subsequent proceedings.

In New Brunswick, Appeals from decisions in Equity must be made within twenty days. Appeals from Courts of Marriage and Divorce must be