

*Military Equipment Export Restrictions*

nothing about it. It took no action to tighten up its procedures at that time. Now that the Liberals are in opposition they say they want to go further than this motion that asks for a standing committee to look at the matter and make recommendations. We also had Liberal Government complicity in the 1970s with sending arms shipments to Vietnam through the United States.

Ernie Regher in his book entitled *Arms Canada* pointed out that because of defence sharing agreements with the United States and highly developed arms production in Europe, Canada had specifically targeted the Third World as the major market for our arms sales. In fact, arms sales from Canada to the Third World have tripled in the last decade.

Mr. Regher also pointed out that there was a basic foreign policy conflict which we are not really examining. On the one hand we say we are for peace and development. On the other hand we blindly sell weapons to whomever will buy them. Mr. Regher said that arms sales represent an economic activity, not an instrument of foreign policy. Foreign policy is sometimes dragged in by the heels in a very weak process of review, but arms sales are not seen as integral to our policy.

We have backward priorities in the whole area. Instead of having the bias in terms of looking at Canada's interests in world peace, security, and development, our primary objective is to sell arms products and then look at what the implications might be in what has been described as a very weak review process.

That review process allows us to sell arms to countries like Chile. I was privileged, along with members of other Parties, to visit Chile last fall. One person with whom we met who most impressed my colleagues and I was Dr. Juan Luis Gonzales, a medical doctor who is President of the Civic Assembly in Chile. He is a very mild-mannered human being who acts out of concern for his fellow Chileans. He was arrested and he served time in jail. He spoke of the climate of fear which pervades Chile. He said that everyone lived in fear and that the poor were absolutely terrorized. We also heard evidence from him that he knew personally of up to 30-35 people who had been tortured.

Are we to expect that sending computers to Chile is a purely neutral act? Of course it is not. They are used in the whole apparatus of repression. We need much tighter controls.

When I was in Ethiopia a year ago, I heard testimony from its Minister of Labour and Social Affairs who said:

The money we have spent on defence in the last 10 years would have enabled us to feed ourselves in spite of the drought.

Ethiopia is not a recipient of Canadian arms sales, but it illustrates the eschewed priorities of our world.

In conclusion, I simply urge the House to accept the motion. When the committee looks at the matter, I hope it will recommend some annual public review policy of Canadian arms sales and will examine the human rights records of countries receiving Canadian arms. I also hope that it will develop more stringent criteria for application in terms of

human rights, that it will adopt a public registry of arms export permits so that people can find out where arms are being shipped, and that there will be stricter monitoring of end use. It is not enough for us to export to the United States under the Defence Production Sharing Agreement. We must know what is the end use.

I urge support for the motion. I urge that we question the entire Canadian arms export policy. We should stop being part of this madness which spends \$1 trillion per year on instruments of death and destruction.

• (1740)

**Mr. Bill Attewell (Don Valley East):** Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to enter this debate. Canada's export controls policy has occasionally been criticized over definitions of what is considered to be a military good. As well, a number of individuals would wish the Government to extend the application of its law and policy with respect to military or other exports outside our national borders. Canada is not alone in this regard, as many of our NATO allies with similar export control regimes face similar pressures.

As my colleague has pointed out, the Government's policy on the export of military goods and technology derives from objectives which have been in effect over the past quarter century. In the interests of clarity, I wish to inform the members how the Government decides why it is that some goods should be controlled and others should not.

By way of background let me say that the controls which Canada applies to exports of military and strategic goods to the Warsaw Pact countries, the People's Republic of China, Albania, Viet Nam, Mongolia and North Korea are based on national security considerations, which are co-ordinated or harmonized with the export control programs of a number of allied countries. Canada, along with Japan and its NATO partners, except Iceland, 16 states in all, participates in an international arrangement known as the Co-ordinating Committee on Multilateral Strategic Export Controls or COCOM.

Within COCOM, three international embargo lists have been established by consensus through a negotiating process. These lists define goods and technologies which would make a significant contribution to the military capability of potential adversaries. Goods and technology so identified are thus embargoed or denied to these countries known as COCOM proscribed destinations. The COCOM munitions list, for example, includes equipment that is specially designed for use by the military, while the industrial list is made up of civilian high-technology goods that are considered to have strategic value.

The COCOM lists are used as the basis for the domestic national security controls maintained by each member country. Groups 3 through 8 of Canada's export control list are based principally on the international lists established in COCOM. Thus the Canadian export control listing includes,