

*The Address—Mr. Pearson*

exaggerate differences of view between the Asian and the western members of the free world and indeed bring about a formal division between the members of the western world in the United Nations. Nevertheless there could be no doubt that the Chinese communists had engaged in aggression and had attacked the forces of the United Nations; and in the last resort we could not refuse, as I saw it, to recognize that situation in a resolution of condemnation if that resolution were pressed to a vote, if it stated the actual position fairly, if it were not couched in unnecessarily provocative terms, and if it included within it provision for negotiation. In all of my discussions with the Indian delegate at the United Nations—and I have had a great many with him in the last two or three weeks—I made that position perfectly clear to him; and he at no time was under any misunderstanding or misapprehension about the Canadian position.

Last week we had two resolutions before us at the United Nations and we were faced with a decision as to what we should do about them. We realized that that decision might indeed have far-reaching consequences. The first of these two resolutions was the Asian resolution providing for a seven-power conference in which both the U.S.S.R. and communist China would be represented, a seven-power conference not only for political discussions but for cease-fire discussions and a seven-power conference the terms of the invitation to which seemed to us to be couched in a form which might have made possible protracted discussion with Peking before the conference ever met. For that reason we did not find that resolution satisfactory, and in a speech last Friday we suggested certain points which we thought would remove the danger from the Asian resolution if those points could have been included in it, because they would have laid down in a resolution a concrete and definite program for talks without delay. In those points we even suggested a date for the convocation of a conference, a place where it might be held and a time limit after which, if Peking did not reply, we would assume that they would not accept it. In those points we tried to remove from the aegis of this seven-power conference—which included a good many states who were not joining in the police action in Korea, including the U.S.S.R., which had refused to support action from the beginning—the negotiations for a cease-fire and send them to a more appropriate body of three: the United Nations commission in Korea, the United States and the Peking government. If those points which we put forward and had discussed previously with the Indian delegation and the United States

had been included in the Indian resolution, we would have voted for it. One of them was included. The others were not, I presume because it was felt that the inclusion of those other points might have made it more difficult for Peking to accept the resolution.

The United States' position with regard to our points was a simple one. They felt that the time for any further approach to Peking was over until the resolution of condemnation and setting up the good offices committee had been passed. So when the Asian resolution came to the vote, we could not vote for it, for the reasons which I have indicated. We could not vote against it because the principle of negotiation was one which we had stood for. Therefore we abstained from voting. In our attitude on this matter, so far as Canadian policy is concerned, I do not think anybody in India has any reason to feel that they were let down.

The second resolution was submitted by the United States. We had been unsuccessful in our efforts to secure postponement of that resolution. We had been successful in our efforts to get that resolution changed and also to get it clarified and interpreted by the United States delegate, which interpretation removed most of the doubts we had with regard to it at the beginning. Our first objective, postponement, was not successful. Our second objective, to get the proper kind of resolution voted on, I think was reasonably successful. We were anxious to make clear beyond any possibility of doubt that any resolution which the United Nations passed on this subject would be exceedingly clear indeed on the following points. We were anxious that it would not establish any new aggression but would emphasize that the Chinese government at Peking had merely participated in an old aggression and therefore was guilty of that but not of starting a new aggression in any other part of Korea. We were also anxious that the paragraph of condemnation should be couched in unprovocative terms, and it was. That paragraph does not brand anybody as an aggressor. It is a finding of fact that, by assisting the aggressors in Korea and by invading North Korea from China, the people's government in Peking had itself engaged in aggression. That was a finding of fact which we certainly could not deny. The third point we were anxious to make clear was that the collective measures committee set up by this resolution and as to which many delegations had grave doubts, would not be a vehicle for rash and unwise action but might indeed become a brake on such action; and that this collective measures committee, far from jumping into resolutions and reports on sanctions at once, should not even report to the