

rewards for the peasant as the best way now to get results. The Communists have not of course retreated from the principle of collectivization, but the peasant's own plot now seems to have become again a respectable part of the system; whereas previously, in recent years, it was merely a reprehensible survival of capitalism.

As for Soviet external policy, it still presents a mixed pattern of some things that are hopeful and more that remains stubbornly discouraging. There have been some minor concessions and some reassuring words. However, I suggest that nothing in all this gives us cause to believe that basic Soviet objectives in foreign policy have changed, or that Soviet leaders are in fact ready to accept reasonable solutions to major international problems. That is one reason why we are watching so closely the Berlin conference today.

The second European development which stands out in the last year is of course the remarkable, and to some people disturbing, recovery of West Germany. While this process has been under way for some time, both in the economic and the political field, the decisive electoral victory of Chancellor Adenauer last September, drew special attention to the progress and the stability of the West German republic. The people of the Soviet zone of Germany, where an election such as that would never have been permitted by the occupation authorities, nevertheless managed to show their own will for freedom during June of 1953 in courageous demonstrations against the communist regime, and by so doing they exposed once and for all the hollownes of the claim that the Soviet puppet regime could speak for them at home or before the world. And that fact is worth keeping in mind, particularly at this moment. The Soviet Delegation at the Berlin conference may once again pretend that Germany can be united in an all-German Government, formed not by free elections but by merging the present East and West German governments. Well, we all know what happened to democracy in Poland and Czechoslovakia when Russian Communist agents were allowed to share governmental responsibility with genuine democrats. It would be deplorable if that tragic error were repeated in Germany.

There is of course a reverse side to this medal. The very qualities of energy and discipline which have served the West Germans so well and resulted in their new strength are beginning to arouse concern among some old friends of ours who are also old neighbours of theirs, and it is easy for anyone whose knowledge of European history goes back beyond the last two or three years to understand this concern. Europe is no longer simply an East and a West, with a void left in the centre by the total collapse of Germany in 1945. Once again there is a centre. We have therefore not only the continuing danger of Soviet imperialism; there is also fear of what many Europeans and others who remember 1914 and 1939 regard as the reviving danger of German ambition and German armed strength. I think we can understand this fear without agreeing with the conclusions which are sometimes drawn from it. But let us assume that there is a basis for it, a reality to the fear. What then is the best method of removing it, to restrain a rearmed and perhaps a reunited Germany from aggression again?

Well, one method of controlling the menace of German aggressive expansion is the old unhappy one, by which the west joined with the east against an independent armed