If this resolution is rejected, what do we do then? Well, of course there are least three courses: The United Nations can preserve and hold on in Korea along the present line, bringing about as much military success as is possible within the limits of the present strategy. It may be possible within those limits -consideration by the military authorities in the Unified Command is being given to this -to add to the number of Koreans who are defending their own country. But in respect of that it should not be forgotten ...that at the present time a 155-mile line in Korea is being defended by 15 divisions, of which I think 9 are from the Republic of Korea, 5 from the United States and 1 division is from the Commonwealth. Of this line, 60 per cent is being held now by Korean troops; 25 per cent by United States troops, and 15 per cent by other United Nations' forces. This course, following our present strategy, will require of course a steadiness and patience not only in Korea, among the soldiers, but at home; it will require military steadiness, and it will certainly require political steadiness.

The second course would be to increase military pressure, to formulate new strategy in the hope that by doing so we will bring this struggle to an end by military means. There are obvious risks in following that course. There is the risk that we might extend the war to the continent of Asia without ending the war in Korea, and that is a risk which is in all our minds, and which indeed we have discussed in this house before.

But there is a third course, to withdraw and turn Korea over to the aggressor, and that is one that will not be supported I am sure by any government, any parliament or any people, which have accepted United Nations¹ intervention in Korea against the attacker.

It is interesting ... to recall that the President-Elect of the United States- has returned from Korea and has already stated that there is no easy, no trick solution, no panacea for this Korean campaign, and he is quoted in the press as having said in Seoul during his visit to Korea:

"How difficult it seems to be in a war of this kind to work out a plan that would bring a positive and definite victory without possibly running grave risks of enlarging the war."

But while we may be discouraged about our lack of immediate progress in ending this campaign, with its great drain on resources and men of the United Nations, and particularly on those of the United States, and those from the Korean forces, which are bearing the brunt of the struggle and bearing it steadily and courageously, apart from that difficulty, we must not forget that we have gained also by intervention in Korea, because we have stopped aggression there, and the lesson of that action is not lost on those who would begin aggression elsewhere. I suggest ... that it is not only the course of honour, it is the course of ultimate safety not to weaken in this United Nations' operation which we have taken in Korea, while always emphasizing, taking advantage of every opportunity to emphasize, that we are ready for an honourable political solution with the Chinese Communist government.

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