weapons numbers. Even here, however, they must be carefully used, since they are not always internally consistent. Particularly, they become less and less clear when addressing intermediate range nuclear forces, a difficulty which is in no way confined to DOD publications. Another interesting source can be found in John Collins' Congressional Research Service Reports which document Soviet-US comparisons in every weapon category as far back as 1974.

In 1984 NATO Information Services published NATO and the Warsaw Pact Force Comparison, an update to a first edition published in 1982. The paper concentrates primarily on the two alliances at conventional force levels, addressing strategic and intermediate range nuclear forces in terms of long-range modernisation trends rather than specific totals or counts of existing nuclear forces.

There are few Soviet sources available, and they generally present figures on American forces only. The main Soviet source, Whence the Threat to Peace is a response to Soviet Military Power. Not surprisingly, the Soviets take the opposite approach to the American and focus on the quality of American forces, emphasizing accuracy and the modernization of American strategic systems. However, there is very little detailed information about Soviet forces. Some of this information can be found in statements made by Soviet officials to explain proposals put forward in Geneva. For example, a revealing contrast between American and Soviet counting approaches to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) balance emerged in the early debates on the nuclear balance in the European theatre. The American count of Soviet forces was four times higher than the Soviet count; the Americans claimed that the Soviet had 3,825 missiles and planes that should be counted in the INF negotiation, the Soviets counted 975.4 (It should be noted however, that the two sides are much closer on strategic weapons).

In addition to these annual publications, there are a large number of other sources which are valuable for information purposes. These include the CIA

⁴ The New York Times November 30, 1981, p. A12