

program? Would the Soviets have allowed such inspections which could have revealed a clear-cut violation to an arms control agreement? The answer to the first question is probably yes; the answer to the second is probably no. However, refusal of an OSI would have reinforced suspicions of illegal activities and led to focus of other collection resources on the facility.

In addition to the BTWC, there has been a recent agreement among the United States, Britain, and Russia which will provide British and American experts with access to Russian biological research sites. The provision for inspections is the most important element of the new trilateral agreement; the experts will be able to visit declared non-military biological sites in Russia to insure that germ warfare work is not being carried out at the sites at the time of the inspection.

Confidence-Building, Transparency, and Conventional Force Regimes *George Lindsey*

Aerial Surveillance and "Open Skies"

The use of aerial reconnaissance for the monitoring of military facilities and equipment on the ground has been discussed for many years. For application in Europe it has been considered in two contexts. As a confidence-building measure, the Open Skies Treaty is intended as an instrument for openness and transparency, rather than as an integral instrument for inspection or verification. In contrast, the CFE Treaty negotiations saw aerial inspections as a means of verification. Complicating this picture, the Vienna Document of 1992, following the deliberations of the CSCE, allowed for the use of helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft during inspections, but as part of an extensive set of confidence building measures.

In March, 1992, an Open Skies Treaty was signed by 24 countries. All the territory of the United States, Canada, the European members of NATO, the former non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, and other signatories who may join later, will be

open for overflight by specially equipped aircraft. This includes large areas beyond the limits of the CFE Treaty, and no parts are to be exempt.

Under the Open Skies Treaty, each participating state is given a quota, specifying the number of overflights which it can make in a year, with the obligation to accept the same number over its own territory. The intention to conduct an overflight of another country must be communicated three days before arrival at a designated point of entry. On arrival, the detailed flight plan is delivered, with the overflight to follow within twenty-four hours.

The Treaty places severe restrictions on the sensors that can be used in the aircraft, and stipulates a minimum altitude for the overflight which is intended to limit the resolution that can be obtained in the imagery. During the first three years after the Treaty comes into force, the only sensors permitted are optical panoramic and framing cameras, to be flown at altitudes which will limit the resolution to 30 cm. After three years, video cameras, line-scan infrared sensors, and synthetic aperture radar will be allowed, with maximum resolution to be 50 cm for the IR devices and 3 m for the radar.

It is to be expected that aerial surveillance will be used for verification in coming years. The CFE Treaty provides for an aerial inspection regime upon completion of the residual validation phase (that is some 44 months after the Treaty enters into force). For multilateral arms control, it should be easier for many nations to take part in aerial inspection than in the more advanced forms of space surveillance. High-resolution surveillance satellites are possessed by only a very few states, and these are unwilling to distribute the imagery beyond their own carefully restricted control.

While the presence of aircraft in national airspace represents a degree of intrusion, the amount of detail which can be observed depends on the sensors which are carried, and on the altitudes flown. When the verification is part of a treaty the sensor packages and

