

a certain guarantee that chemicals and equipment supplied for inoffensive purposes will not be directed to other purposes. Such measures are meaningful only if they lead to the conclusion of a convention on the comprehensive and total prohibition of chemical weapons and on their destruction. In the same line of thinking, and for the same reasons, we consider all regional disarmament and arms control measures in this sphere as inadequate and ineffective given the fact that CW arsenals are highly mobile.

Verification of the non-production of chemical weapons is without a doubt one of the most thorny problems still to be resolved. The provisions necessary to settle this problem should rule out any possibility of cheating, should be technically appropriate and should fit perfectly with the existing structures in the chemical industry. Finally, such provisions should strictly protect the confidentiality of the information provided during inspections. The guarantee of confidentiality is the essential prerequisite for the vital co-operation we must maintain with the chemical industry. And in this regard we welcome the efforts made by the Conference on Disarmament in recent years to maintain constructive dialogue with the industry. We also welcome the initiative taken by the Government of Australia in convening an international conference in Canberra to bring together governments and industry representatives.

Early, this year, further to a proposal made by the Ad hoc Committee, we carried out a national trial inspection in a facility belonging to our chemical industry. What we were seeking to do in particular was to determine what were the commercial documents, technical data and software of a confidential nature that would have to be communicated to the inspectors so that they could carry out their job properly. Furthermore, we wanted to know whether a modern multipurpose facility could be checked under the existing provisions. Our trial inspection clearly demonstrated that the inspectors must have extensive access to confidential data in the company being inspected if the inspection is to be effective. The results of the experiment also confirmed that the provisions which appear in the "rolling text" are not yet sufficiently developed for the verification of a modern multipurpose facility. In particular they do not take into account the technical sophistication flexibility of use of such facilities, which mean that not only can production be changed in very short order but also that it can be transferred from one facility to another. In order to take account of such a possibility, a régime will have to be devised that will make it possible to verify multi-purpose facilities which might pose a threat to the convention.

Our trial inspection had been designed as a routine inspection. None the less we consider that the future convention should also provide for spot checks such as challenge inspections and ad hoc inspections. These two types of inspection should constitute an effective tool to dissipate any doubt as to compliance with the convention. The resumption of Soviet-American consultations on this issue seems to us to be a good sign.

Is it desirable to draw up a convention that covers the slightest detail and every eventuality? In seeking to do our work too well we might hamper the conclusion of an agreement or arrive at a very rigid treaty setting out burdensome and complicated procedures. Such a text would have to be constantly updated to take account of technological developments and scientific evolution. The drafting of detailed rules for this purpose should be left to the preparatory commission, which would thus have a most important job to do.