

by no means exempt from the possibility of attack, at any moment, and even of invasion, are not reasons why the government should abandon a policy based upon considerations of the preservation of national unity. It is the strongest of reasons why the government should give the most careful consideration to all possible consequences of any change of policy which might result in division and a weakening of national unity.

I doubt if any of us begin to realize how grave the responsibility has become of determining the disposition of the country's armed forces, as a consequence of the changed conditions resulting from the entry of Japan into the war. Immediate danger no longer threatens Canada only from the east. It threatens equally from the west. Let that danger assume formidable proportions, and I ask what will be said of a government, or for that matter, of a parliament, or of a press, that continues to look only across the Atlantic to one enemy against which this country has to be protected, and fails to recognize that the strategy of the combined enemy forces may well involve an attack at any moment from across the Pacific.

In deciding upon the disposition of the armed forces, the government has to consider from day to day, just what proportion of its forces our country is justified in sending overseas, and what proportion it is necessary to keep at home. That question has had to be considered from the outbreak of war but, until Japan entered the war, it did not begin to have the importance it has now come to have.

It is perfectly clear that the enemy will have to be destroyed overseas if this continent is not to be the field of the final conflict, or possibly even an immediate field of conflict, with Canada the scene of the first invasion. It is equally true that in the event of an attack, come when it may, and from whichever direction it may, unless we have forces adequately equipped, and trained in sufficient numbers to prevent the enemy from getting a foothold upon

our soil, our entire national existence will be imperilled. While we must continue to do all we possible can to assist in accomplishing the defeat of the enemy away from our shores, we must also be in constant readiness to meet and hold him at bay should he attempt an attack upon our shores. What guarantee have we that the enemy having begun to destroy shipping off the coasts of the maritime provinces, in the gulf of St. Lawrence and in the river itself, and having attempted to gain a base for operations against the Pacific coast, we may not witness at any moment bombing of our harbours and cities alike on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, and attempts to destroy railway terminals and facilities, munition plants, aerodromes and other military targets in any part of the country.

#### Need for a free hand

With those possibilities before our very eyes, and let me tell this house as I have told the country time and again, they are possibilities which are by no means remote, can we afford to allow any question of conscription to become the occasion of a political battle in parliament, or of political warfare throughout the country; can we allow the country itself to become distracted by and divided over such an issue. Surely the only reasonable course to take in dealing with this question is to leave to the government, subject to its responsibility to parliament, to decide what disposition it may be best to make between the forces to be sent abroad and those that are to be kept at home, and what means it may be necessary to take to keep up the strength of the armed forces which are already overseas.

The people of Canada have clearly indicated their desire that freedom to decide on these matters should be given to the government, subject only to its responsibility to parliament. It is that freedom which, by the amendment, the government asks should now be given to it by parliament.