similar position here. And as constitutional *history* is not
unlikely to fall into the hands of constitutional lawyers,
there is some danger lest they should be unduly influenced
by their professional habit of thought, and should take that
narrow view of constitutional history which identifies it
with the description in order of time of a number of con-
stitutional instruments. Indeed, a modern Canadian
writer expressly defines constitutional history in this way.
He says :

"This year, 1887, is the centenary of the United States
constitution, and the amendments to the original document
can be comprised in less than two pages of an ordinary
book. These changes and the decisions of the supreme
court of that country are the basis and *substance* of the
United States constitutional history. So it is and will be
in this country, though the amendments are effected in a
different way, and the judicial interpretations may come
from any of our courts."

This, which may be called the lawyer's conception of
constitutional history, however satisfactory for the lawyer's
purpose is, as I would have you believe, inadequate from
the point of view of political science. For our purpose is
to try to understand what the real character is of the
political society we are considering. Constitutional instru-
ments may mark the stages in development may ; even
come, as it were, to have a strength of their own and serve
as the barriers within which political life must move ; but
just because they are constitutional instruments and not
lengthy treatises they cannot explain themselves, and they
cannot determine the use that will be made of them. To
use an obvious example, suppose we knew nothing what-
ever of the constitution of the United States except the
document called the "constitution," should we be able to
form any picture of the actual working of its political
system ? The constitutional document says nothing what-
ever of the existence of *party* ; its framers expected that