

unjust peace is sometimes preferable to a just war. It is better, perhaps, that the quarter of a million Germans of South Tyrol should be left helpless victims of the ferocious policy of Italianization, which is the darkest blot upon the statesmanship of Mussolini, than that a million and a quarter of their fellow Germans should lay down their lives in a war to deliver them from their oppressors.

There are steps that the United States can take along the path of pacifism in foreign policy with great profit to itself. The Monroe Doctrine should be scrapped as an obsolete shibboleth. It has long been regarded by the states of Latin America as an officious and unwelcome tutelage. After a hundred years of South American independence the doctrine that the United States owes its protection to these infant nations is as obsolete and as destitute of any real validity as the sob-stuff of our high-tariff advocates over the necessity for protection of America's "infant industries," that doctrine by virtue of which our Southern cotton grower has for a century been more and more deprived of the natural outlets for the half of his crop which he could otherwise export, - deprived by a series of "tariffs of abominations."

It should be within the memory of millions now living that the Monroe Doctrine brought the United States to the brink of a fratricidal war with Great Britain over the question of whether a few thousand square miles of thinly peopled land lay within the boundaries of Venezuela or of British Guiana. To express the value of the lands in dispute in terms of American lives one can only quote that famous saying of Bismarck, which would have prevented the World War if his successors had taken it to heart, "The whole of the Balkans is not worth the bones of one Pomeranian grenadier."

It would be also the part of wisdom to go a little way with the pacifist in the direction of disarmament by abandoning the doctrine that the United States must maintain a navy second to none. The most rudimentary knowledge of geography, the most casual glance at the map of the world must convince any intelligent man that it is spend-thrift extravagance for the United States to build ship for ship with the far flung loose-knit empire of Britain. The big navy propagandists argue that had the United States had naval parity with Great Britain in 1914, America could have added to the millions made from trading with the Allies other millions made from trading with the Central Powers. But the British interference with American Trade was not due to the weakness of the American navy, even then the third navy of the world; it was because Woodrow Wilson would not go further than paper protests against the British blockade, and because the British knew that he would not. It was because Germany's crimes against international law, the violation of Belgium and the murder of the helpless passengers of the "Lusitania" made it morally impossible for the United States to take any action that would help the central powers to victory. The three thousand miles of undefended and indefensible British frontier which form the northern boundary of the United States are a sure guarantee against any danger from British Navalism.

There are also moral reasons for discarding this slogan. When President Roosevelt proclaims "the way to disarm is to disarm," and in almost the same breath asks Congress to vote hundreds of millions for the construction of more men-of-war, the Anglo-Saxon mind, accustomed to keep its ideas separate in water tight compartments,