## March 25, 1969

States Government, namely withdrawal of forces, a continuation of the present effort, or further escalation. The Co-chairman called in the Canadian expert to relate his experiences with China and try to combine this discussion with the Vietnam problem. The Canadian delegate mentioned that he was first in touch with the Chinese authorities in 1960 in connection with the cash sale of wheat which was finally ratified in January 1961. He mentioned that Chinese authorities at the time were eager to move out of their self-isolationism and expand commercial relations with other parts of the world. This was viewed by the Canadian delegate as an opportunity for the American Government to come in with the Canadian Government on the grain sales to Communist China. The Canadian delegate at the time visited with President Kennedy who was impressed by the proposal but later said that the American Government would be aggreeable to give China all the grain they wanted if they only asked for it. This was felt unacceptable by the Chinese authorities and the deal never came through.

The Canadian delegate stressed the considerable difference in China between the "politicians" and the "trade people." The politicians were idealists, believing that the nature of a whole generation could be changed by political action and measures. They were considered very dogmatic whereas the trade people were much more practical and down to earth in their beliefs and dealings.

During a visit to Peking, the Canadian delegate was called in by the Prime Minister, Chou En-Lai, who exposed what were the three main points in Communist China's foreign policy. The first and most important one was the recovery of all territories that China possessed before 1900, namely, territories now held by Korea, Taiwan, and the Soviet Union.

Another objective in their foreign policy was to modify the relationship existing between the major powers and the countries on which they exerted their influence. This applied to both the Soviet Union and the United States of America. The third objective of Peking's foreign policy was to take over the lead in the world Communist movement. Chou En-Lai felt that they were best suited to take that lead because he believed that no white man could understand what it is to be a colored man.

On the Taiwan question Chou En-Lai was reported to have said that the crucial problem was that Taiwan was inhabited by 10 million original Taiwanese in addition to 2 million or so refugees from mainland China. Chou En-Lai accepted the principle of self-determination and mentioned that these 10 million original Taiwanese should eventually have the opportunity to express their views on the question.

The Canadian representative mentioned that mainland China at the moment is getting ready for a big confrontation with the Soviet Union. It was not contemplating any confrontation with the United States at this time but feared it and was willing to fight if need be. It was a significant fact, the Canadian delegate said, that the majority of young Chinese children learned as their second language the English language and also that Chinese have never attacked the Americans, but rather the ruling class of America which they considered imperialistic. The Canadian delegate mentioned that the main difference between Communist China and the great powers stems from the fact that China traditionally has considered itself the greatest culture and the centre of the world and that it resents deeply the cultural superiority of the other great powers.

The Canadian delegate also mentioned and in this also concurred with Americans and other Canadian delegates who spoke earlier, that the cultural revolution had been a failure and that the managerial class seemed to be progressively taking over from the politicians.

The discussion then turned to Vietnam and the U.S. delegation inquired of the Canadian delegate who had related his experience in China whether he had any views that might be helpful to the U.S. in arriving at a termination of the struggle in Vietnam. The Canadian delegate responded by indicating that he thought that the U.S. must establish a dialogue with Communist China and that if China thought that it could obtain what it desired in Taiwan even if this was many years away, it might then put pressure on Hanoi by reducing military supplies to that government and thereby helping to end the war in Vietnam.

One of the Canadian delegates asked the U.S. side to define the current U.S. objectives in Vietnam. A U.S. delegate indicated that it was the objective of the U.S. to find a way of terminating the conflict but we have found no