

place when all outstanding bonds have been retired. On several occasions, the bridge operators have been allowed to make additional bond issues, either to bolster a weak financial position, or to carry out repairs or improvements, and the effect of this has been to postpone reversion. In the case of the Thousand Islands Bridge, the Bridge has undertaken certain improvements and is using these as a lever to issue additional bonds and thus postpone reversion. However, the 1962 guidelines indicate government preference for public authorities to run bridges, and it is presumably desirable that this situation should be reached as soon as possible. On that basis, there should be no postponement of reversion, and no action which could lead to postponement. Clearly, as income-producing bodies, the bridges have other sources of funding besides bond issues, and they should be required to use these in relation to work on the Canadian half of their bridge rather than make bond issues which postpone reversion.

In the case of the Rainbow, Whirlpool and Lewiston/Queenston bridges, there is no Canadian legislation and no provision for reversion, but presumably legislative action could be taken to correct this.

In general, reversionary clauses require the Governor in Council to designate the body to which the reversionary interest shall be assigned, although on occasion the legislation itself indicates the assignee. Problems can arise in these cases when the designated party declines to accept the assignment. The refusal of Ontario to accept the reversion of the Blue Water Bridge was solved when Canada accepted it, but the same situation could arise in connection with the Thousand Islands Bridge where the legislation specifies that the Canadian half of the bridge will revert to Ontario. The province has however already indicated that it is not interested. It is therefore desirable that all