

interested affections are generated, mainly through the influence of association, out of a primitive root of pure regard for Self, and that, when they have been thus generated, the voluntary actions in which they manifest themselves, are done from habit, without motive. Mr. Mill, after remarking that "a person of confirmed virtue, or any other person whose purposes are fixed, carries out his purposes without any thought of the pleasure he has in contemplating them, or expects to receive from their fulfilment," adds: "This, however, is but an instance of that familiar fact, the power of habit, and is in no wise confined to the case of virtuous actions. Many indifferent things, which men originally did from a motive of some sort, they continue to do from habit. Sometimes this is done unconsciously, the consciousness coming only after the action; at other times, with conscious volition, but volition which has become habitual and is put in operation by the power of habit." Now, I am not at present arguing against Utilitarianism, though the view for which I am contending, is, I believe, fatal to the Utilitarian theory. I am concerned solely with the assertion that, when a certain course of conduct has become habitual, actions may be done with conscious volition and yet without motive. This I cannot admit. For why is anything called a motive? Because, as it is in the view of the mind, it stimulates to action. Why do Utilitarians say that pleasure is a motive? Because pleasure is an end which men aim at in the actions which they perform. No other possible account of motive can be given, than that it is the end—the ultimate or true end—aimed at, which, contemplated by the mind, stimulates to action. Well, then, if a good Samaritan, to whom the practice of benevolence is become habitual, aims at the relief of a suffering neighbour, without any thought of the pleasure that is to accrue to himself, or without the thought of anything except benefiting the sufferer, is not the desire of attaining this end the motive of his action in precisely the same sense in which the desire of pleasure is the motive, where pleasure is the end sought? I do not deny that habit may lead to spontaneous action, where no end is consciously sought and, therefore, no motive felt. I object to Mr. Mill's statements only in so far as they relate to voluntary action. Habit renders voluntary action, in an accustomed course, easy. It does so by strengthening the impulses towards the