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## PERSONAL REPRESENTATION AND THE REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES.

### II.

HAVING endeavored to explain the principles, and practice incident to the Representation of Minorities and to Personal Representation, the next point is to examine the relative merits of these systems of election as compared with each other and with our present system of election by majorities. For efficiency in securing a full and complete representation of the community, there can be no comparison between Mr. Hare's system and either the restricted or the cumulative vote. The former would secure the representation of all classes, interests, and opinions, according to their numbers, and either of the latter could, at best, only secure a fair representation of different political parties. But it is contended by many that Mr. Hare's system is utterly impracticable, by reason of its complexity; and some go so far as to allege that, even were this difficulty overcome, it would be, for various reasons, inexpedient. No satisfactory decision on the expediency of adopting it can be reached until the correctness of these views has been examined. This, I believe, can best be done by allowing its opponents to speak for themselves; and then subjecting their arguments to a fair criticism. Of all the opponents of Personal Representation, the ablest appears to be the late Mr. Bagehot, who, in his well-known work, '*The*

*English Constitution*,' has assailed it most keenly. This gentleman admits that 'if Mr. Hare's plan would accomplish what its friends say, or half what they say, it would be worth working for, if it was not adopted till the year 1966'; that for *mis*-representation it would substitute correct representation; that it gets rid of all difficulties as to the size of constituencies; that under it 'the admirers of a great man could make a worthy constituency for him;' and that he 'could reckon other advantages.' But having done this he goes on to oppose it on the ground that 'the voluntary composition of constituencies appears to him inconsistent with the necessary pre-requisites of Parliamentary Government,' and supports this theory in the following language:—

'Under the voluntary system the crisis of politics is not the election of the member, but the making the constituency. President-making is already a trade in America; and constituency-making would, under the voluntary plan, be a trade here. Each party would have a numerical problem to solve. The leader would say: "We have 350,000 votes, we must take care to have 350 members;" and the only way to obtain them is to organize. A man who wanted to compose part of a liberal constituency must not himself hunt for 1000 other liberals; if he did, after writing