be able to visualize or understand only so far as his mind is in possession of the requisite material; and that will be best which he has really made his own from observation and experience; or, in other words, it will be fact, or what seems to him to be such. This also applies, to a great extent, to the child's use of imagination in original construction: but here, whatever may be the material used, the character of the construction lies within the child's own power; and, in his choice of the particular construction, there is no more reason to restrict the child than the man of science solely to the region of the actual, or what seems to be such to the child himself, or his human surroundings. To do so would be to impede the child's own spontaneous movement from the known to the unknown—for the actual here means that which is known to exist. Experience and truer knowledge will in due course correct his faulty constructions. The main thing is to insure, as far as possible, that the child shall not follow the lead of vague or excessive emotion, but that the emotion aroused should be enlightened by intellect and controlled by will. The man of science, with his mind instructed by fact and educated by experience, is not only an observer but also a discoverer; and he cannot add new territories to the realm of knowledge without crossing the frontier of the known. No doubt many an expedition will be fruitless; but it is only by such expeditions that great discoveries are made. The man of science gains his strength and skill from observation and experience; but when searching for a new truth, his conjectures and hypotheses and mental pictures go beyond what he actually knows; though, of course, when what seems a new truth has been lighted on it must be brought into touch with known fact before it can be accepted while the discoverer himself, however much he may strain forward into the unknown with one hand, must never lose his firm hold of fact with the other. Let us not forget that the child's imaginings are often his spontaneous endeavors to discover.

I have spoken only of the realm of knowledge. In the realm of art, where imagination subserves the purposes of pleasurable feeling rather than those of knowing, it is plain that still greater freedom must be allowed in the choice of the resulting construction unless art is to be synonymous with photography. There must be something more than plain matter of fact in poetry, prose, or picture to give it a right to the name of art—a touch of feeling, a gleam of light, a sense of harmonious construction, a breath which blows aside, if but for an inch, the dust of the actual. But the strength of art lies as much in revelation as in invention. Its essential qualities are insight, selection, and beauty of combination. It, too, like idealization—which is the fine art of conception—must take its rise in observation and experience, must draw its materials from them; and, however high it may rear its head, must keep its feet firmly planted in realities. But, though æsthetic imagination must perforce, in order to be intelligible, and draw the details of its materials from the common knowledge and experience of mankind, its right to a large and generous freedom in the choice of constructions should not be unduly questioned. The test of matter of fact cannot always be applied to the resulting construction.

From what I have just said three deductions follow naturally, (1) In all departments of mental exercise, matter of fact is of great value and in most it is of supreme importance. Facts must be sought for and made as accurate as possible. But in some