

"crawled out from under" by ourselves, the result to the Covenant would have been less grave, but our interpretative resolution lets everybody out, and assuredly has contributed to the feeling of insecurity and uncertainty which haunts so many peoples situated in dangerous positions. If a Japanese military dictator to-day were to invade China herself, and devastate the country right to Canton, there is nothing left in Article X to oblige any State-Member to do anything more than convene its parliament in case the Council called for help. This explains in part the "spinelessness" and "powerlessness" of the Council last November. What has happened is exactly the kind of thing that has always been forecasted by the advocates of a strong League.

Again in 1924 we of the British Empire turned down Ramsay MacDonald's "Protocol of Geneva". Had we endorsed it, subject to a reservation concerning the United States, we should have strengthened the League and its Council, and the Disarmament Conference would have been held automatically long ago. Locarno was no substitute for it, as Locarno ignores the really controverted areas. Senator Dandurand and Sir George Foster alone seemed to grasp the necessity of doing something strong, if we really wished disarming to become practical politics.

However, I should not single out our attitudes on Article X and the Protocol or our concurrence in the undermining of Article XVI by another of these deadening interpretative resolutions. Our whole view of the League has been of a piece with them. In season and out of season our representatives have deprecated all concentration of thought upon unpleasant realities, - upon such nasty and improbable eventualities as