

such a conclusion entitled to base upon, and that arriving at such a conclusion was consistent with their continued hatred to an determination ultimately to abolish fascists in Germany. I am not here to argue the case was Soviet Russia, ^{right} in its appraisal of the affairs that were going on between September '38 and August '39 or ^{that} ~~was~~ Great Britain and France ^{here} ~~right~~. That is not my objective at all. But I do indicate facts which would be consistent with Russia having reached a non-aggression pact in August '39 on the basis of a continued anti-fascist outlook and an ultimate anti-fascist war. Now I shall read from a document which was issued by the French government immediately after the outbreak of the war. It is known as the French Yellow Book and I think it is one of the most interesting of the volumes which have emerged during the war. I, at any rate, found the reading of it when it was first published -- it was published in 1940 -- most illuminating and educational. I am going to read a very few pages from the book. The book consists of no comments; there is no text. It actually gives and duplicates various communications from the French ambassadors in various centres of the world to the Foreign Office in Paris in order to indicate the trend of events and it is devoted only to the years 1938 and 1939. I say that reading these official documents one will find that there were two causes, the complete unreadiness which produced such a hesitation as to indicate to the Soviet authorities a determination not to conclude any pact with Russia. I am not saying that the conditions that prevailed at that time did not justify France and Britain in so deciding. They may have had very good reasons which we personally know nothing about, questions of armament and all that sort of thing which dictated that course; but there