

accepted international rules and making good use of all possibilities in these rules to create opportunities for their own development, it is essential to fight for greater voice in the formulation and modification of these rules at the same time, in order to make them more rational. Facts have shown that it is workable though the road is arduous.”¹⁷

Among some of the most active proponents of the “new security concept” are the senior researchers at Beijing’s China Institute for International and Strategic Studies. The latter is known for its very close ties to the PLA leadership. Senior Research Fellow, Luo Renshi, for example, argued in 2001 that the “new security concept” fosters a rational and comprehensive notion of security, which effectively includes the contemporary emphasis on economic security, and is therefore likely to gain increasing international acceptance. Luo contrasted the rationality of cooperative security with the liabilities of apparently outmoded Western realist theory that focuses on military blocs and “the equilibrium of forces”.

Perhaps preparing the ground for increased Chinese expenditure on qualitative military modernization, Luo challenged the underlying assumption of Western “realism” that capability is, in and of itself, the prerequisite indication of “threat”. Alternatively he argued that “threat” ought to be ascertained on the basis of a complex understanding of national and international realities. The related line between truly “defensive” and “offensive” national defence postures had, therefore, to be qualified with significant and factual reference to military strategic guidelines, actual strategic objectives and the underpinnings of foreign policy. Luo then drew attention to China’s new multilateral citizenship and support for regional security dialogues and the distinction between China’s truly “defensive” defence strategy and “forward deployment”.¹⁸

In his assessment of the impact of high-tech weapons development on the global strategic environment, Luo claimed that the National Missile Defence (NMD) and Theater Missile Defence (TMD) systems were designed to achieve US strategic

¹⁷ Zhang Yijun, “Globalization, Multi-Polarity, Uni-Polarity and Americanization”, *Foreign Affairs Journal*, Beijing, 2001 copied from “World Economy and Politics”, no 12, 2000, p. 18.

¹⁸ Luo Renshi, “Defense for Common Security—And a Concurrent Remark on [the] White Paper: China National Defense 2000”, *International Strategic Studies*, Beijing, no. 1, 2001, p. 23.