

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

indispensable elements for drafting the chemical weapons convention. I wish to express my sincere appreciation to Ambassador Pierre Morel, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, for his untiring efforts, wisdom and leadership. I would also like to commend the chairmen of the five working groups for their excellent work.

We have not, however, had a breakthrough on important political issues - for instance, how to reach a common basic understanding on verification régimes including challenge inspection, the composition and decision-making of the Executive Council and undiminished security during the transition period. We must take into account the interrelated nature of those issues and others within the overall framework of the Convention.

The Paris Conference generated a global political momentum for the CW negotiations. But looking back over what took place in the Conference this year, I have a sense of uneasiness that the momentum might be slipping out of our fingers. Setting an artificial deadline for the negotiation is of course not necessarily conducive to a good treaty. On the other hand, can we just go on and on, business as usual, and get a treaty on issues like chemical weapons of such political magnitude? I am not sure if it will work. We must have a common perception of the political target of the time frame of the negotiation. We must have political determination to work with that political time frame in mind, if we are to have a CW Convention.

The Government of Australia will host the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons in three weeks' time. Japan will participate in the conference and work for its success. We hope the conference will give further impetus to the CW negotiations here. I am grateful to Ambassador David Reese for clarifying the character of the conference in response to the joint statement of the Group of 21. Japan is gravely concerned at the growing danger of the spread of chemical weapons. In this respect, Japan is taking, individually and in concert with like-minded governments, appropriate measures in conformity with paragraph 4 of the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference. On the other hand, our global efforts must be concentrated on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, and not on any intermediate measures.

Verification problems are very difficult, both politically and technically. While it may be impossible to establish a watertight verification régime, we should strive for the setting up of a verification régime which is reasonably effective and reliable. It is also important to take note of the basic differences between the verification of CW destruction, which is conducted for 10 years, and the verification of "non-production", which lasts for ever.

Working Group 1 has worked out the "Annex on the protection of confidential information". It is indispensable to protect the confidentiality of both military and civil information in a proper way. For that, I believe, this annex is an important product. The Group has also addressed the "Protocol on inspection procedures", verification régimes under article VI and