

from beyond the Canadian Arctic islands and reach military targets in the United States, there would be a need for detection and tracking capabilities much superior to those currently promised in the North Warning System.

Despite these prospective developments in Soviet SLCM programmes, it remains unlikely that SSBNs and SSNs carrying cruise missiles would make use of restricted Canadian Arctic waters on a regular basis. In sum, the position appear to be as follows:

1. Given the ranges of the most modern Soviet SLBMs, and the relative protection of home waters, the Soviet marginal ice zone, and the deep Polar basin, the strategic reserve function of Soviet SSBNs is better served from the Soviet rather than the Canadian side of the Arctic.
2. The future use of the Canadian Arctic for deployments of submarines in a precursor or decapitation role cannot be ruled out, but the distances involved suggest that, for most targets, Pacific and Atlantic deployment would be far more advantageous. This, of course, raises the possibility of greater Soviet use of non-Arctic Canadian coastal waters in proximity to US military targets.
3. On the other hand, it is evident that Canadian Arctic waters are useful to US attack submarines seeking to enter Soviet submarine sanctuaries in the Norwegian and Greenland seas via the Polar basin. For example, the Sturgeon class SSNs, some of the Los Angeles 688 class, and the planned new US attack submarine, the SSN-21 Seawolf, have an under-ice capability. Soviet activity in the Canadian Arctic might be motivated in part from the need to counter this anticipated US threat, in which case it could be expected that the Soviets would apply pressure on the choke points — the navigable channels from the waters of the Canadian archipelago into the Arctic basin. In addition, if the Soviet Union anticipates US forward pressure on Soviet SSBN sanctuaries, the use of Canadian Arctic basin waters as an unexpected dispersal area in times of crisis cannot be ruled out.
4. Finally, Soviet SSNs might use Canadian Arctic waters to avoid the more heavily defended G-I-UK gap in order to deploy into the North Atlantic. Although this is superficially plausible, it should be remembered that there are major offsetting disadvantages to transit through Canadian Arctic waters. First, Arctic under-ice navigation is far more difficult and dangerous than traditional open-ocean routes. Second, as discussed in section VI, it would be relatively easy to close off the Canadian Arctic straits with modest under-sea detection systems augmented in times of crisis by anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces.

If these general propositions are correct, an analysis of Canadian naval requirements in the Arctic might focus on two propositions. First, there is a strong case for the development of a Canadian ASW capability within the waters of the Archipelago, the purposes of which would be to provide