

this runs perilously close to an entirely different variety of arms control where unilateral verification is all that is necessary and where Confidence Building *per se* isn't really the object – "simple" arms control reductions. Constraint Measures are really a different type of undertaking that seek to place some operationally relevant constraint on worrisome capabilities through the restriction of certain specified types and/or numbers of military forces and/or specified types and/or numbers of equipment that are regarded as threatening in specified geographic zones regarded as sensitive. *It is the intent to address the concern that distinguishes true CBMs from simple quantitative or qualitative reductions.*

1. **Personnel Constraint Measures.** This collection of proposals deals with restrictions on the number and/or position of military personnel. Very often, these constraints are associated with geographic areas, particularly regions adjacent to borders. The main idea is to limit military forces in sensitive regions so that concerns about surprise attack are minimized or at least reduced. In terms of severity, the proposals range from a freeze on manpower within an alliance region during reduction negotiations to proposals that call for percentage reductions of manpower levels or reductions to common ceilings. Thus far, most personnel constraints have been dealt with in the context of MBFR. Several other proposals have called for a freeze on alliance membership itself and a freeze on new bases for alliance partners' troops. All of these proposals seek to restrain existing high levels of military manpower and some address reductions. They are usually politicized and sometimes reflect very obvious self-serving ends. Some proposals have suggested the creation of partially or completely demilitarized zones of varying depths adjacent to international borders. The bulk of substantive Constraint Measure proposals have tended not to deal with *in situ* or overall personnel levels. Instead, they have focused on more specific capabilities or activities that many regard as particularly threatening.
2. **Manoeuvre and Movement Constraints.** Recognizing that surprise attack is the primary military concern of some states (there are altogether too many examples in Cen-

tral Europe, Northern Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, South-east and East Asia, Southern Africa, Central Africa, Central America, and South America), a number of CBM proposals have been designed to reduce or virtually eliminate the chance of manoeuvres or military movements either masking or being mistaken for surprise attack preparations. The easiest way to accomplish this is to keep manoeuvres and movements small and to keep them away from sensitive frontiers. This does *not* provide any outright guarantee against surprise attack but it does address the problem of the misperception of "legitimate activities." These proposals call for various types of limitations on manoeuvres near the borders of adversary states. The limitations include low manpower ceilings for all manoeuvres within a given distance of borders (25, 50 or 100 kilometers), similar types of restrictions on military movements, time limits on the duration of manoeuvres (i.e. not to exceed 10 days or two weeks), limitations on how many major or meaningful manoeuvres or movements a state or alliance can stage in a year, general manpower ceilings on manoeuvres and movements, limits on multinational exercises (usually size and proximity constraints), and limits on the activities that can be practiced during manoeuvres. This last type of proposal deals with agreements such as those to limit the amount of live ammunition and other crucial supplies like fuel carried during manoeuvres and agreements to never practice simulated chemical or tactical nuclear weapons-use or associated activities like decontamination. The general idea of these Constraint Measures is to reduce potential friction and over-reaction to activities that could be viewed ambiguously. A related type of manoeuvre or test constraint proposal has to do with the testing of nuclear delivery vehicles (primarily ICBMs). These proposals call for the use of designated re-entry vehicle impact areas, prohibitions against multiple simultaneous or close-order missile test launches (in particular, from operational silos), agreements to conduct only a minimum number of test flights a year to ensure system reliability, and major test restraints on new types of delivery vehicles such as Manoeuvring Re-

