From the same gentleman, who was present, in an important position, on the argument of the Dominion License Act case, I learned, in the same conversation named above, that it was then his expectation that the Supreme Court would hold precisely as they have since done; and that they would so hold on the authority of what they considered was the holding of the Privy Council in *Hodge* v. *The Queen.*

I asked him if the attention of the Court had been called to the fact, that, in *Hodge* v. *The Queen,* while the right of the local legislatures to make regulations of a mere local or municipal character, with reference to taverns, was sustained; their lordships carefully guarded themselves by saying, that, in the localities in question, the Canada Temperance Act did not appear to have been adopted; and that there was nothing in that case which over-ruled *Russell* v. *The Queen.*

He replied, that that point had been strongly insisted on; but that the indications were that the court looked upon the two cases as irreconcilable, and would probably follow what they considered was the holding in the later of the two cases —*Hodge* v. *The Queen*—which, it seems, they have done. But, as to whether they have been right in so doing, I would beg, very gravely, to question; even though the judgment has been that of Ritchie, C. J., as well as of the rest of the Court.

As to my having expressed an opinion in my book that the License Act is valid; and that my "condemnation" on that point is determined by the holding of the Supreme Court of Canada; I beg to submit that the JOURNAL, in its February article, is in error.

In my book I showed that two entirely different principles are established with reference to the validity of the Canada Temperance Act, by the Supreme Court of Canada, in the *City of Fredericton* v. *Barker;* and, by the Privy Council, in *Russell* v. *The Queen.* I, then, p. 181 of my book, applied