

experience, is, I think, inclined to be easily alarmed, and this point must be taken into account in valuing his estimate of the situation. I enquired if he had thought of notifying his Government and perhaps asking for a warship to be sent. He replied that he had not. Yesterday, however, he informed me that one of the warships of their special service fleet was coming here on a friendly visit about the end of this month. The arrival of this warship, belonging as it does to the special service squadron, is of interest in view of his admitted apprehensions.

If a revolution should occur, it seems improbable that it will follow the lines of the last effort. The leaders are more likely to pursue a policy of intrigue culminating in some bold *coup d'État*. Their plans may also include the winning over of the army, since the soldiers are generally known to be discontented and are probably indifferent as to whom they serve. Any rising on the Colombian frontier or in remote parts of the interior would stand less chance of success than on the former occasion since the Government have now taken the precautionary measure of forbidding the possession of arms and ammunition in the country, and the army is well equipped with supplies recently obtained from France.

We have considerable commercial interests at stake in the country, and its value as a petroleum producing area now makes it of increasing importance both to the United States and to ourselves, but in the event of a disturbance occurring, it seems unlikely that these will be in any immediate danger. Any change that may occur seems more likely to result from success in intrigue than success in arms.

I have, &c.

T. J. MORRIS.

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Memoranda & Notes

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