

in February 1932 when the Conference for reduction and limitation of armaments met at Geneva. This endeavor dragged on until 1936 when Germany's attitude and her repudiation of the League made further efforts senseless.

I should here like to mention one episode in these efforts following World War I which deserves attention. As I said earlier in this paper, a protocol outlawing the use of chemical and bacteriological warfare was signed by 29 nations including the United States in 1925. It was ratified by 41 nations including the U.S.S.R., France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The United States and Japan did not ratify. The protocol deserves attention because of its simplicity. It was merely an agreement to abstain from the use of asphyxiating poison or other gases and bacteriological weapons in war, providing no safeguards and no international system of control. In World War II gas was not used by one nation against another although the Germans used gas in gas chambers to exterminate large numbers of enemy civilians and prisoners. I think it is safe to say that fear of reprisals offered a strong deterrent against the use of gas in war. Certainly also there were very few occasions in which gas might have been used with decisive advantage and in each of these cases there were substantial tactical and technical reasons against its use. In drawing conclusions from the non use of gas in World War II we must not forget however that all the principal nations engaged had devoted very great attention to development and new gases of terrible potency were available.

In the discussions at Geneva a special jargon developed which made it very difficult for the general public to follow the debates with understanding. There was competition between the advocates of "qualitative" as contrasted with "quantitative" disarmament; others were advocates of indirect means of limitation such as "budgetary"; some asserted that armaments could be classified as "offensive" or "defensive" and that the former should be eliminated and the latter encouraged; in one phase of the discussions weapons of "peculiarly aggressive character" came in for much debate.

The lesson to be drawn from this experience is, I think, that care must be taken to keep discussions of disarmament to simple, well understood terms so that the public may know what is going on. It is important also that in discussing these matters the new terms with their special technical meanings should not be allowed to obscure the simple facts and political principles on which in the final analysis acceptance or rejection must rest.

Summarizing the lessons to be drawn from the great efforts in the study of disarmament made from World War I until the outbreak of World War II it would appear to have been proved conclusively, that any effective system of disarmament must be general and not unilateral or limited to regions or to a few nations; that it must be enforceable by an international system of collective security; that all nations must participate in good faith, and that any system must be accompanied by adequate and effective safeguards to protect all states against evasions and violations. These safeguards necessarily involve a system of international "security checks" with a corresponding surrender by all nations of some portion of their national sovereignty, or as I prefer to put it, the creation of an agency to exercise these powers effectively on behalf of all the nations.

#### CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The Charter of the United Nations, though not as detailed in some respects as the League of Nations Covenant on the subject of disarmament, contains several articles which bear examination, and