

and enhancement of the military alliance.<sup>6</sup>

When military, economic, and political planners first contemplated the five years following the end of the Second World War, that period had been anticipated as a time of transition from war to peace, a "phase" or "stage" of reconstruction, rehabilitation, and readjustment.<sup>7</sup> The dissolution of the wartime alliance and the development of a global confrontation were not then part of the reckoning. Planning for the postwar, like the prosecution of the war itself, was dominated by the partnership developed between the United Kingdom and the United States, with Canada in a privileged but subordinate position. The professed aims of the wartime allies, particularly in the realm of external economic policy, were declared first by the senior partners, then elaborated in bilateral "discussions" which the Canadians followed closely and which they sometimes influenced considerably.<sup>8</sup> Before the war was over, those pronouncements and plans had become agreements or drafts of agreements. The package dealing with monetary policy, which was negotiated at Bretton Woods, included the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or World Bank. As for commercial policy, that was the subject of Anglo-American "Proposals for Consideration by an International Conference on Trade and Employment" which eventually led to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), but not to a more comprehensive International Trade Organization (ITO), which had been the wartime aim. There were also accords covering various other subjects, including military relief and civil aviation, many eventually linked to the nascent United Nations.<sup>9</sup>

Whether as negotiators or as confidants of the principals, Canadian officials emphatically supported these initiatives to introduce order and stability into international economic affairs. That stance was an application of enlightened self-interest, with the "multilateral" purposes of the agreements upheld not only for their merits but also as a way of overcoming Canada's triangular imbalance.<sup>10</sup> As the deputy minister of finance, Clifford Clark, put it, Canada was "the extreme case of the effects of the repercussions of U.K. and U.S. relations."<sup>11</sup> Though progress toward the goal was uncertain and its benefits not immediate, a multilateral system still appeared to represent "the greatest assurance of continuing prosperity, and harmony with both the United States and the Commonwealth."<sup>12</sup> Understandably, Canadian policy-makers did not rely solely on promises for the future. During the war, Canada had made a remarkable economic contribution to the allied cause, with a disproportionate share of its pro-