

All of these various factors are channelled in one way or another into political and security policy-making and decisions, and influence state expenditure allocations. For the sake of simplicity, the diagram has divided government spending into "security" and "socio-economic" baskets, although this does not in any way reflect the complexity of spending decisions, or (more importantly) the relative weight of security spending, which is almost never more than a small proportion of government spending.⁷ Two things are worth highlighting from this section of the diagram. First, security allocations involve much more than simple decisions about "how much to spend." Issues such as the nature of the force (professional vs. conscript), its weaponry, its size, or its social composition, can have a great effect on whether or not it provides or threatens security. Narrowly sectarian armed forces, for example (such as the Alawis domination in Syria, or the Hutu-Tutsi divides in Rwanda and Burundi) can have enormous societal repercussions. Second, socio-economic expenditures are also subjected to a "logic of security": the level of social spending, infrastructure development, or openness to the world economy are often in part conditioned by a sense of how to achieve greater human or societal security and well-being.

The Consequences of Security Expenditures

With respect to the potential *consequences* of security expenditures, both positive and negative possibilities have been listed. The three dimensions labelled in Figure 4 include the traditional element of inter-state security and conflict, the element of regime security and communal conflict that captures the concerns of states and regimes with the internal aspect of security, and the dimension of societal and human security that captures developmental and human welfare concerns. Again, most attention to date has focused on the inter-state dimension - on the circumstances under which military spending can enhance security or provide stability in a threatening environment, or can contribute to arms races, exacerbate interstate conflicts, or even facilitate wars of aggression.⁸ In regions such as the Middle East or South Asia, for example, particular conflict dyads (such as India-Pakistan or Israel-Syria) appear to be strongly influenced by reciprocal military expenditures and preparations, many of which have been "stabilizing" (although of course such conflicts always have deeper roots). As noted above, several of the highest military spending states are currently (or have recently been) embroiled in acute inter-state conflicts.

While important, such a restricted focus fails, however, to take into consideration the other dimensions of the broader definitions of security that today appear to play a role in the policy making of both regional

⁷ The global average of military spending as a percentage of central government expenditures was 11.5 percent in 1993. In roughly sixteen states, it represented more than one-quarter of government spending, and in roughly 50 states, more than 15 percent. Figures from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1993-94*.

⁸ McKinlay, 83-109; Kendall Moll and Gregory Luebbert, "Arms Race and Military Expenditure Models," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 24:1 (1980), 153-185.