

attractive, the South African government deployed terrorist forces into Mozambique and regular military units into Angola to disrupt the economies of the "Front-Line States." In consequence, in 1985-87, individual countries established comprehensive trade bans, notably the Nordic countries and the United States, and the Commonwealth and the European Community established more selective bans. Britain, however, only established a voluntary ban on investments, refusing to order comprehensive economic sanctions because of the impact they would have on the British economy.

A system of pro-active sanctions could have countered the destabilization strategy, and met Britain's economic needs. A tax collected on trade with South Africa could have been used to stimulate investment in the Front-Line states, and to pay for United Nations forces combating guerrilla attacks. Because the tax would have diverted but not interrupted world trade, it could have been continued as long as the Republic of South Africa continued its racial policies. Pro-active sanctions could have stopped or even reversed the flow of people looking for work in South Africa, and established model multi-racial states on the border of the Union. It is not improbable that the South African government would have consented to the United Nations using some of the revenue inside South Africa to promote the economic status of the black community.

As it happens, South Africa undertook its own restructuring to eliminate apartheid. The literature agrees that sanctions have had a significant impact on the South African economy, and that the economic effect has produced political results.<sup>55</sup> While it would be unscholarly to refuse to acknowledge that sanctions may have been a major force for change, it is appropriate to observe that one of the recurring patterns in the history of economic warfare is that defeated leaders find it convenient to blame economic forces. It is also appropriate to observe that a system of sanctions which did not have so clearly a negative impact on world trade might have been instituted thirty years ago, and might have brought about the present reformation somewhat earlier, and somewhat less convulsively. Such a process might have been less satisfying to the moral outrage of a world community accustomed to think in terms of full-blooded coercion, but it is to be hoped that international opinion could have been educated to see the value of such a creative strategy, one that appears to be in sympathy with current efforts at reconstruction and reconciliation in South Africa.

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<sup>55</sup> See for instance, Joseph Hanlon, Successes and Future Prospects of Sanctions Against South Africa, Discussion Paper No. 2; and Quarterly Report, November 1992, both published by the London School of Economics, *Centre for the Study of the South African Economy and International Finance*, (London, 1990 and November 1992).