

The audience for the Iraq crisis of 1990/91 was huge and multinational, creating Marshall McLuhan's Global Village in an almost literal sense. Mr. Turner's after-dinner speech, much of which sounded like an extended CNN commercial for itself, is published as an appendix to this report. It contains a memorable dictum: "Governments will use and manipulate if they can. The manipulatee must determine whether what is being offered is newsworthy." The offerings are often propaganda, but that too can be news in the context a given story.

National leaders who played their parts in the crisis sometimes contacted Atlanta expressing a desire to appear before this world-wide audience, which included millions of plain citizens, but also the peer-group in the leadership club, the experts and officials who were advising the leaders, and the pundits who filled in the blanks, analyzing, criticizing, prophesying.

In a luncheon speech on the day following Mr. Turner's after-dinner performance, CBC reporter Ann Medina drew laughter and applause for her parody: "What worries me is you get this image of the future of the Larry King talk show where we have King Hussein on line two, we have Gadhafi on line one, who are we going to punch up first?" The parody was close to truth. Mr. Turner had described an incident where the Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi, who played the satanic role for President Ronald Reagan as Saddam Hussein does for President Bush, had telephoned four times clamouring for air time before anyone at CNN believed it really was Gadhafi. In the end, it proved impossible to connect his tent to a satellite link. King Hussein phoned the same night and went on the air, his palace presumably being better equipped for electronic journalism than Gadhafi's tent.

The leading adversaries in the contest of wills, George Bush and Saddam Hussein, were frequently seen on CNN and other networks, stating their rival cases to the peoples of the world, one of them sometimes speaking in a way that suggested an effort to persuade the other, and always trying to gain the moral advantage. Saddam, however, appeared to have little grasp of how his performances would be understood by people in the United States and its allies. For example, early in the crisis before the war began, he